DISCLAIMER:

These summaries of case decisions are intended for informational purposes only. They are not intended to be interpretations of the law, nor do they encompass the subtleties of each case. Therefore, reference to the original text is indispensable.



Thursday, May 17, 2012

Paul J. Souza v. Registrar of Motor Vehicles & another



·      Procedural History
 Driver appealed decision by Board of Appeal on Motor Vehicle Liability Policies and Bonds affirming license suspension. The Superior Court Department, Norfolk County, Elizabeth v. Donovan, J., 2011 WL 4626109, affirmed. Driver appealed and parties jointly applied for direct appellate review which was granted.

·      Issue
How should the word “convicted” be defined in G.L. c. 90, § 24(1) (f) (1)?

·      Facts
In 1997, the plaintiff was arrested for operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor (OUI). He admitted to sufficient facts for a finding of guilty and he did not plead guilty. His case was continued without a finding and later dismissed after he had successfully completed the terms of his probation, including assignment to an alcohol education program.

The plaintiff was arrested again for OUI on January 14, 2010. He refused to submit to a breathalyzer test. Thereafter, the registrar of motor vehicles suspended the plaintiff’s driver’s license for 3 years on account of his refusal to take the test.

·      Holding
The Supreme Judicial Court, Botsford, J., held that driver whose prior operating under the influence (OUI) case was continued without a finding and later dismissed after he successfully completed the terms of his probation was not convicted under statute that required three-year license suspension for subsequent OUI.

·      Reasoning:
In order to determine who has been “previously convicted of a violation,” we must first look to G. L. c. 90, § 24(1) (f) (1), which defines the term “convicted” for purposes of all the subsections of § 24(1). The pertinent part of § 24(1)(d) reads:
“…a person shall be deemed to have been convicted if he pleaded guilty or nolo contendere or was found or adjudged guilty by a court of competent jurisdiction, whether or not he was placed on probation without sentence or under a suspended sentence or the case was placed on file…”

A fundamental tenant of statutory interpretation is that statutory language should be given effect consistent with its plain meaning and in light of the aim of the Legislature unless to do so would achieve an illogical result.  By its terms, the definition of “convicted” in § 24(1)(d) confines itself to a guilty plea, a plea of nolo contendere, a finding of guilty, or a judgment of guilty. The definition makes no mention of an admission to sufficient facts; an assignment to an alcohol education, treatment, or rehabilitation program (program assignment); or a continuance without a finding (CWOF). Evaluated in connection with the plain words of the statutory definition, the plaintiff’s 1997 disposition, namely, the admission to sufficient facts followed by a CWOF and a program assignment, does not qualify him as someone who has been previously “convicted of” OUI.

·      Disposition: Reversed (EH)