· Procedural History
Union representing commissioned state police officers, and
individual officers, brought action against Commonwealth, Department of State
Police, and division of human resources of the Executive Office for
Administration and Finance, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief, alleging
that officers had been incorrectly subjected to mandatory furlough plan ordered
by Governor. The Superior Court Department, Suffolk County, Christine M. Roach,
J., dismissed the complaint, and union and officers appealed.
· Issue
Whether the officers had been incorrectly subjected to mandatory
furlough plan ordered by Governor
· Facts
On October 15, 2009, the Governor, acting on his authority
pursuant to G.L. c. 29, § 9C, announced a mandatory furlough plan that required
all managerial employees in the executive branch to take a prescribed number of
unpaid furlough days during fiscal year 2010. The Department of State Police
(State police) determined that “manager” encompassed all uniformed officers
holding the rank of lieutenant and higher.
In their second amended complaint, the plaintiffs sought
declaratory relief, pursuant to G.L. c. 231A, and injunctive relief, pursuant
to Mass. R. Civ. P. 65, 365 Mass. 832 (1974), alleging that, pursuant to the
public employees collective bargaining statute, G.L. c. 150E, § 1, they were
incorrectly identified as “managers,” and, therefore, the furlough plan was
improperly imposed on them. They also sought monetary relief, pursuant to G.L.
c. 149, §§ 148 and 150, alleging that the furlough plan deprived them of
“earned” wages.
A nonevidentiary hearing was held in June, 2010. During the
hearing, the plaintiffs additionally alleged that the deprivation of “earned”
wages pursuant to G.L. c. 149, § 148, violated their entitlement to a set
salary pursuant to G.L. c. 22C, § 28A. A judge in the Superior Court allowed
the defendants' motion to dismiss, finding that the plaintiffs did not have a
valid cause of action because none of the statutes on which the plaintiffs
relied applied to the furlough plan.
· Holding
After transferring the case on its own initiative from the Appeals
Court, the Supreme Judicial Court, Ireland, C.J., held that officers and union
lacked standing to bring action.
· Reasoning
Declaratory relief pursuant to G.L. c. 150E
In order for a court to entertain a petition for declaratory
relief pursuant to G.L. c. 231A, a plaintiff must, in relevant part,
“demonstrate the requisite legal standing to secure [the] resolution [of an
actual controversy].” However, G.L. c. 231A, by itself, does not provide an
independent statutory basis for standing.
Pursuant to the unambiguous language of G.L. c. 150E, § 3, the
statute excludes from its scope of protection State police officers whose rank
is lieutenant or captain.
In addition, although the definition of “manager” in the
division's guidelines contains some similarity to the definition of “managerial
employees,” pursuant to the plain language of G.L. c. 150E, § 1, the definition
of “managerial employees” is applicable only to G.L. c. 150E. Moreover, the
statute protects the rights of public employees specifically to self-organize
and to bargain collectively. There is nothing in G.L. c. 150E to suggest that
the Legislature intended to incorporate any and all issues affecting public
employees or the terms of their employment in its purview, much less to
constrain the executive branch's discretion regarding state budgets and
furlough plans pursuant to G.L. c. 29, § 9C. In short, the plaintiffs' claims
do not come within the “‘zone of interests' arguably protected by” G.L. c.
150E. There was no error.
Monetary relief pursuant to G.L. c. 149, § 148, and G.L. c. 22C, §
28A
The plaintiffs have not demonstrated that G.L. c. 22C, § 28A,
confers a property interest in their salary, or that the word “earned,” for
purposes of G.L. c. 149, § 148, incorporates future payments of their salary
pursuant to G.L. c. 22C, § 28A. We have held that Commonwealth at-will
employees, like the plaintiffs, “do not have a property interest in future
wages (for future services) for which the Commonwealth has decided not to pay”;
rather, they have a “mere expectation as to payment from the Commonwealth for
future services.”
In addition, although the word “earned” pursuant to G.L. c. 149, §
148, is not defined, its plain and ordinary meaning is “[t]o acquire by labor,
service or performance.” Awuah v. Coverall N. Am., Inc., 460 Mass. 484, 492,
952 N.E.2d 890 (2011), quoting Black's Law Dictionary 584 (9th ed. 2009).
“Where an employee has completed the labor, service, or performance required of
him, therefore, according to common parlance and understanding he has ‘earned’
his wage” (emphasis added). Awuah v. Coverall N. Am., Inc., supra. Accordingly,
we conclude that a prospective reduction in the number of days to be worked
does not deprive the plaintiffs of any wages “earned.” In these circumstances,
the plaintiffs do not fall within the “‘zone of interests' arguably protected
by” G.L. c. 149, §§ 148 and 150.
· Disposition
Judgment Affirmed. (EH)
