Facts: On March 15, 2008, the defendant, Steven
Nutbrown, and his friend, Christopher Bates, were both drunk and driving when
the car crashed into the victim causing serious injuries. The victim could not
identify the driver because the defendant and Bates hid their faces. The fact
regarding the driver of the car at the time of the accident was in dispute.
Attempting to show that Bates was the driver, the defendant filed a motion in
limine seeking the admission of three sets of Bates’ statements against penal
interest. The defendant offered the following statements made by Bates: (1) the
statement made to the defendant’s mother that he was the driver, but he put the
blame on the defendant because he was just out of jail and was afraid they’d
send him back; (2) the statement made to the defendant’s friends that he was
going to tell the defendant’s attorney he was driving in the accident; (3) the
statement made to the defendant’s attorney that he was driving the car.
Ultimately, the statement made to the defendant’s attorney was admitted and the
other two were excluded. The defendant argued that the other two should also be
admitted.
Issue: Whether Bates’ other two statements against
penal interest should be admitted?
Yes. The court used three-part test for admission of
Bates’ statements against penal interest. In order for evidence to fall within
the hearsay exception for statements against penal interest, “[1] the declarant’s
testimony must be unavailable; [2] the statement must so far tend to subject
the declarant to criminal liability ‘that a reasonable man in his position
would not have made the statement unless he believed it to be true’”; and [3]
the statement, if offered to exculpate the accused, must be corroborated by
circumstances clearly indicating its trustworthiness.” The court found that
those three requirements for admission of Bates’ statements against penal
interest were satisfied. Unavailability requirement is met because the defense
and the prosecution were unable to locate Bates despite extensive efforts to do
so. The statements were against penal interest because the Commonwealth
properly conceded that this element is met. The trustworthiness element is met.
In determining trustworthiness, a judge should assess the credibility of the
declarant. Here, the main factor weighing against trustworthiness is Bates’s
character and the judge found that Bates’s statements were trustworthy.
Furthermore, the court concluded that exclusion of two other statements was not
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt because the multiple statements interlock to
some degree, forming a coherent sequence explaining why Bates would have
initially blamed the defendant.
Therefore, the judgment for the conviction is reversed. (YK)