Com. v. Jansen

Commonwealth v. Jansen
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court
March 2, 2011
459 Mass. 21

Rape, Joint Enterprise, Double jeopardy, Joint Venturer, Deoxyribonucleic Acid (DNA), Consent

The grand jury returned three indictments against the defendant for aggravated rape. The first indictment charged the defendant with aggravated rape for the sexual intercourse he committed with the alleged victim. The second and third indictments charged the defendant with aggravated rape for the sexual acts committed by his alleged joint venturers. At trial, the jury was not able to reach a unanimous verdict, so the judge declared a mistrial. The defendant moved to dismiss the indictments arguing that because the evidence presented at the trial was legally insufficient, double jeopardy barred a retrial. The trial court granted the defendant’s motion as to all of the charges except for the lesser included charge of rape in the first indictment. The Supreme Judicial Court (SJC) affirmed the trial court’s ruling.

Com v Montalvo, Appeals Ct, 2/25/10

COMMONWEALTH vs. ANGEL MONTALVO, FEBRUARY 25, 2010, Appeals Court

Sufficiency of evidence, Possession

The defendant argued that there was insufficient evidence to convict him of constructive possession of cocaine and of heroin. The appellate court found sufficient evidence to establish constructive possession of cocaine, but not of heroin. The court found ample evidence that the defendant knew that there were drugs in the apartment, that he was in close proximity to drugs and packaging materials, and that he had the ability and intent to exercise control over at least some of the cocaine in the apartment. Important factors in finding sufficient evidence included the location of the defendant and the drugs (together in one room, drugs in plain sight near the defendant) as well as the fact that the house in which the defendant and drugs were found was a “hot house” (such that it had “New York style” locks, was heavily barricaded, and there were few indicators of occupancy). The court emphasized that the evidentiary inference to support a conviction need not be inescapable or necessary, but just that the evidentiary record as a whole supports a conclusion of guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.

While there was sufficient evidence regarding the cocaine conviction, the court did not find the same ample evidence regarding the constructive possession of heroin. The appellate court found that there was no way to infer the defendant’s knowledge of or control over the heroin based on the apparently invisibility of the heroin to the defendant when the police entered the house. The defendant’s conviction of constructive possession therefore was vacated.

Sufficiency of Evidence; Intent to Distribute

The defendant argued that there was insufficient evidence to convict him of intent to distribute cocaine, and the appellate court agreed, finding insufficient evidence of intent. Because there were none of the common factors used in the assessment of intent to distribute, such as large quantities of drugs, the absence of implements for personal use, and the presence of cash and pagers, the court found that the jury must have used guesswork – and not proper inferences – to convict the defendant. The appellate court accordingly reversed the defendant’s intent to distribute conviction.

Sufficiency of Evidence; Joint Venture

The defendant contended that there was insufficient evidence to convict him of participation in a joint venture to sell drugs, and the appellate court agreed. The court found that there was no evidence that linked the defendant to a common venture with the other individuals arrested in the house. The fact that the defendant was found in the house with other individuals engaging in drug sells was not sufficient and accordingly the court reversed the conviction.

Com v Semedo, Appeals Ct, 2/4/10

COMMONWEALTH v. SEMEDO, February 4, 2010, Appeals Court

Required finding, Joint venturer

The defendant was tried separately as a joint venturer in a felony murder. He argued the evidence was insufficient to convict. The SJC disagreed. The issues in the case were whether the defendant was in the van at the time of the murder and whether he shared the intent to commit the robbery. The van was stopped with the defendant inside it an hour after the murder. There was circumstantial evidence that connected him to the homicide which included the physical description provided by a witness, the money found in the defendant’s jacket (which was half the money taken from the victim and which was wrapped in brown paper counting bands of the type used by the victim’s wife to wrap the money for deposit), and the time line of the events on the day of the murder.

The Court also found sufficient evidence that the defendant shared the intent to commit armed robbery. The Court held that since there was evidence that the perpetrators effectuated the robbery while the car was operating, the jury could reasonably conclude that a firearm or other dangerous weapon had to be employed and that the defendant was aware of it. From the evidence that one half of the proceeds of the robbery was in the jacket which by inference belonged to the defendant, a finding was warranted that the defendant assisted in the commission of the robbery while sharing the requisite mental state.

Deliberation of jury

The defendant argued the judge should have declared a mistrial after he received two reports from the jurors that they were deadlocked. The SJC disagreed. After deliberating for nine hours the jury sent a note stating they were deadlocked on two charges. Five hours later they reported they were still deadlocked. Since it was near 5pm the judge sent the jurors home. The following day the jury was read the Tuey-Rodriguez instruction. Later that day they returned the verdicts