463 Mass. 655
Summary
The defendant
appealed her conviction of murder in the first degree on a theory of deliberate
premeditation of stabbing and killing her boyfriend. Although the defendant admitted to stabbing
her boyfriend, she argued that she should not be held criminally responsible
for her actions because she lacked the substantial capacity at the time of the
stabbing due to her post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD).
First, the defendant argued that the
trial judge erred in admitting, on multiple occasions, prejudicial prior bad
acts as evidence. Prior bad act evidence
is generally restricted to the purposes of “common scheme, pattern of
operation, absence of accident or mistake, identity, intent, or motive.” This case did not fall under
any of these purposes. The Supreme Judicial Court ruled that permitting
evidence that the DSS
had a complaint against the defendant
for allegedly abusing her son added no probative information and only
heightened the risk of unfair prejudice. The purported reason for allowing such
evidence was its basis for the testimony of an expert. There was no proof,
however, that the expert did indeed use these prior acts to form her opinion
and the prosecutor simply extracted the details of the incidents through
questions. Furthermore, the lengthy and detailed recitation of the incident
from two DSS case workers served no new probative value and only prejudiced the
defendant. For those reasons the admission of evidence regarding the DSS case
was palpable error.
Second, the defendant argued that the
judge erred in declining to give an instruction as to the excessive use of
force in self-defense, which mitigates murder to voluntary manslaughter. For a defendant to be entitled to use deadly
force, as she did against her boyfriend, she must have a reasonable
apprehension of great bodily harm and a reasonable belief that no other means
would suffice to prevent such harm. The court concluded that the evidence
warranted an instruction about excessive force in self-defense and if the jury
so found, the defendant was entitled to a
verdict of manslaughter.
Third, the defendant maintained that
the judge’s
instructions regarding reasonable provocation
in regards to the defendant’s history of past abuse... Case law stated that not only is
the introduction of evidence of a defendant’s past instances of abuse allowed,
but such evidence should be permitted to establish the reasonableness of the defendant’s
apprehension that death or serious bodily injury was imminent. The defendant’s expert testified that her
past abuse might have been triggered in the encounter with her
boyfriend putting her in a dissociative state when she stabbed him. The court decided
that the defendant’s record of past physical, mental, and sexual abuse was
relevant to the consideration of whether the defendant was in fear of serious
injury or death. Therefore, declining to
give Given the numerous errors, the defendant’s conviction for murder in the
first degree was reversed, the verdict was set aside, and the case was remanded
for a new trial.
Written 7/22/2013
