Procedural History
A Superior Court
jury convicted defendant of trafficking in 200 grams or more of cocaine in a
school zone. The defendant appealed from his convictions and from the denial of
his motion for a new trial. On the appeal, the Commonwealth conceded that the
admission of certificates of drug analysis violated the defendant’s
constitutional confrontation rights.
Factual summary
The State police
arrested the defendant in connection with an undercover investigation. An
officer obtained a warrant authorizing the tape recording of oral
communications between a Confident Informant and other persons involved in the
deal for the purchase. The CI entered a car with the defendant and two men
named Alvorado and Bragg. The defendant and Alvarado subsequently produced the
cocaine. The CI tasted a small amount of the cocaine and told them that the
cocaine was of acceptable quality. His
body wire recorded the entire conversation that took place in the car. The CI
exited the car and confirmed to the officer that the substance he had tasted
was cocaine. Surveillance officers converged and arrested the defendant,
Alvarado and Bragg. Two bricks of a white powdery substance were seized. Each
brick of cocaine was covered in cellophane and wrapped with duct tape and wax. Twenty-nine
thousand dollars in cash was also seized from the rear cargo area of the car. The
officer also seized a ledger that contained names, notations, monetary figures,
and references to cocaine in street vernacular from the defendant’s person.
1.
Whether
the constitutional error in the admission of the drug certificates that
violated the defendant’s confrontation rights was harmless beyond a reasonable
doubt?
The Appeals
Court held that the evidence presented at trial was not so powerful as to
nullify the effect of the admission of the drug certificates. The evidence
concerning the taste test done by the CI; the seized substance had the
appearance and texture of cocaine; the fact that the substance was packaged in
a manner consistent with the distribution of individual kilograms of cocaine;
the $29,000 in cash; and the defendant’s ledger, were insufficient to find that
the constitutional error was harmless beyond reasonable doubt.
2.
Whether
the warrant affidavit demonstrated a sufficient nexus to organized crime and,
therefore, fell outside the one-party consent exception.
The Appeals
Court concluded that there was the requisite connection with organized crime.
The Court reasoned that persons involved in the distribution of kilogram and
multi-kilogram quantities of cocaine necessarily conduct their activities in
concert with others.
3.
Whether
the defendant is entitled to a Franks hearing?
A second
Superior Court judge afforded the defendant the benefit of an Amral hearing. However, based on the Armal hearing, the judge determined the
defendant was not entitled to a Franks
hearing because he did not establish that the affidavit made a false statement knowingly
and intentionally or with reckless disregard for the truth. The Appeals Court
found no abuse of discretion and agreed that the discrepancies did not rise to
the level of requiring a Franks
hearing.
4.
Whether
the second trial was barred by double jeopardy and principles of due process
due to errors in the first trial?
The Appeals
Court held that the defendant’s double jeopardy claim was waived because he
failed to assert it prior to his second trial. As to Trial II, the defendant’s
brief has not cited anything of allegedly broader conspiracy evidence which may
have been introduced in Trial I, and which was introduced again in Trial II.
The Court held that he suffered no resulting prejudice.
Conclusion
The
Appeals Court held that the constitutional error in the admission of the drug
certificates was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Accordingly, the Court
reversed the defendant’s convictions. There was no error in the denial of the
defendant’s motion to suppress and the motion for a Franks hearing. The second trial was not barred by double jeopardy
and principles of due process.
