Com. v. Jansen

Commonwealth v. Jansen
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court
March 2, 2011
459 Mass. 21

Rape, Joint Enterprise, Double jeopardy, Joint Venturer, Deoxyribonucleic Acid (DNA), Consent

The grand jury returned three indictments against the defendant for aggravated rape. The first indictment charged the defendant with aggravated rape for the sexual intercourse he committed with the alleged victim. The second and third indictments charged the defendant with aggravated rape for the sexual acts committed by his alleged joint venturers. At trial, the jury was not able to reach a unanimous verdict, so the judge declared a mistrial. The defendant moved to dismiss the indictments arguing that because the evidence presented at the trial was legally insufficient, double jeopardy barred a retrial. The trial court granted the defendant’s motion as to all of the charges except for the lesser included charge of rape in the first indictment. The Supreme Judicial Court (SJC) affirmed the trial court’s ruling.

Com v LeBlanc, SJC, 2/18/10

COMMONWEALTH v. LeBLANC, FEBRUARY 18, 2010, SJC

Instructions to jury, Consent

The defendant was convicted of inter alia rape, cocaine distribution adn drugging a person for unlawful sexual intercourse. The evidence at trial showed that the defendant raped an eighteen year old female after providing her cocain and alcohol. On appeal the defendant argued the judge erroneously instructed the jury on incapacity to consent by stating that consumption of alcohol or cocaine “does not necessarily mean incapacity to consent. Specifically, the defendant argued the use of the word “necessarily” was misleading because it created a substantial risk that the jury understood the instruction to mean theat the mere consumption of alcohol or cocain might mean that she was incapable of giving consent. The SJC disagreed. The trial judge properly told the jury that the fact that the victim consumed alcohol or drugs did not inevitably mean she was not capable of consenting.

Instructions to jury, “Administer”

The defendant argued that the judge’s instructions interpreting the word “administer” as “gave or provided” were erroneous. The SJC agreed. The statute requires some forceful action, deceit or trickery on the part of the defendant. Merely making alcohol or drugs available is not enough to convict. The SJC found that the error was not harmless and reversed the conviction of drugging a person for unlawful sexual intercourse.