Commonwealth vs. Jamal Martin, May 27, 2010
457 Mass. 14
Motion to Suppress; Search and Seizure; Possession of Firearm
The defendant appealed the denial of his pretrial motion to suppress evidence and statements claiming that he was subjected to an unlawful patfrisk violative of the 4th Amendment of the Constitution of the United States of America and art.14 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights. He also challenged his convictions asserting that the judge erred in admitting ballistics evidence and excluding exculpatory evidence. The Appeals Court rejected his arguments and affirmed his convictions. The SJC reversed the Appeals Court by vacating the order denying the defendant’s motion to suppress, ordered that the motion to suppress be granted, and did not consider the defendant’s additional claims.
Two plain clothed officers were traveling in an unmarked police car through what they determined to be a “high crime” area of Dorchester in an attempt to locate a particular juvenile so they could serve an arrest warrant on him. While they were driving they noticed the defendant wearing a sweatshirt with the hood around his face. The officers drove up alongside the defendant and after several identification questions, and upon seeing the defendant’s face, realized this was not the juvenile they were looking for. However, because the officers believed the defendant was lying to them about either his birthday or his age, one of the officers got out of the car and approached the defendant. The officer informed the defendant that he was going to perform a patfrisk. When the officer reached out the defendant pushed the officer’s hands away and stated “You can’t touch me,” to which the officer replied, “Calm down.” The officer then conducted the patfrisk and discovered a loaded gun.
457 Mass. 14
Motion to Suppress; Search and Seizure; Possession of Firearm
The defendant appealed the denial of his pretrial motion to suppress evidence and statements claiming that he was subjected to an unlawful patfrisk violative of the 4th Amendment of the Constitution of the United States of America and art.14 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights. He also challenged his convictions asserting that the judge erred in admitting ballistics evidence and excluding exculpatory evidence. The Appeals Court rejected his arguments and affirmed his convictions. The SJC reversed the Appeals Court by vacating the order denying the defendant’s motion to suppress, ordered that the motion to suppress be granted, and did not consider the defendant’s additional claims.
Two plain clothed officers were traveling in an unmarked police car through what they determined to be a “high crime” area of Dorchester in an attempt to locate a particular juvenile so they could serve an arrest warrant on him. While they were driving they noticed the defendant wearing a sweatshirt with the hood around his face. The officers drove up alongside the defendant and after several identification questions, and upon seeing the defendant’s face, realized this was not the juvenile they were looking for. However, because the officers believed the defendant was lying to them about either his birthday or his age, one of the officers got out of the car and approached the defendant. The officer informed the defendant that he was going to perform a patfrisk. When the officer reached out the defendant pushed the officer’s hands away and stated “You can’t touch me,” to which the officer replied, “Calm down.” The officer then conducted the patfrisk and discovered a loaded gun.
The trial judge denied the defense’s motion to suppress the evidence stating that the defendant’s pushing away the officer’s hands constituted a new offense of assault and battery on a police officer which gave the officer probable cause to arrest the defendant. The trial judge also decided that the seizure did not occur until the second attempt to patfrisk. The Appeals Court affirmed the trial judge’s ruling, but for different reasoning. They found that seizure initially occurred when the officer first attempted to patfrisk the defendant, but that even at that point the officer had a reasonable belief that the defendant was armed and dangerous. The Appeals court cited four factors that when considered together made the officer’s belief reasonable including, that it was a high crime area, the defendant’s initial hesitation and nervousness, the defendant’s lying about either his birthday or his age, and the ambiguity created by the defendant’s silence in response to the officer’s question about whether the defendant had any weapons. The Appeals Court was divided on this issue, and the dissent called this an instance where the police “turned a hunch into reasonable suspicion by inducing the conduct justifying suspicion.”
In deciding this case the SJC first noted that police require no constitutional justification for consensual interaction with a defendant. The court then stated it agreed with the Appeals Court that the defendant was seized when the officer attempted the first patfrisk, but that at that time the officer had no reasonable belief justifying a seizure. The court discussed that the requirements of a lawful Terry stop include both a lawful stop and then reasonable suspicion that the person is armed and dangerous before attempting to perform a patfrisk. In order for the stop to be considered lawful the officer must reasonably suspect the person apprehended is committing or has committed a criminal offense.
The SJC acknowledged that although their ruling in Commonwealth vs. Fraser could have been interpreted as allowing an officer to escalate a consensual encounter to include a patfrisk when the officer comes to reasonably believe the individual is armed and dangerous. However, the court went on to say that they had clarified this in a recent case, Commonwealth vs. Narcisse, No. SJC-10421, in which it was determined that in order for an officer to escalate a consensual encounter to include a patfrisk, the officer must have both a belief that the suspect is engaging in criminal activity and is armed and dangerous, thus if it started out as a consensual encounter, the officer must become reasonably suspicious not only the suspect is armed, but also that he intends to use the gun. Here, the SJC rejected the Appeals Court's four factor reasoning saying that it did not give the officer reasonable suspicion because (1) nothing in the defendant’s appearance suggested he had a gun, (2) the defendant was not known to be involved in criminal activity, (3) the defendant’s nervousness may have been reasonable considering his young age and inexperience dealing with police, (4) the defendant had every right to ignore the officer’s question and his silence could not be used to confer reasonable suspicion to the officer. The SJC also rejected the Commonwealth’s argument that the defendant’s act of pushing the officer’s hands away constituted a new intervening crime giving rise to probable cause to arrest him and that the completed patfrisk was an arrest.
In deciding this case the SJC first noted that police require no constitutional justification for consensual interaction with a defendant. The court then stated it agreed with the Appeals Court that the defendant was seized when the officer attempted the first patfrisk, but that at that time the officer had no reasonable belief justifying a seizure. The court discussed that the requirements of a lawful Terry stop include both a lawful stop and then reasonable suspicion that the person is armed and dangerous before attempting to perform a patfrisk. In order for the stop to be considered lawful the officer must reasonably suspect the person apprehended is committing or has committed a criminal offense.
The SJC acknowledged that although their ruling in Commonwealth vs. Fraser could have been interpreted as allowing an officer to escalate a consensual encounter to include a patfrisk when the officer comes to reasonably believe the individual is armed and dangerous. However, the court went on to say that they had clarified this in a recent case, Commonwealth vs. Narcisse, No. SJC-10421, in which it was determined that in order for an officer to escalate a consensual encounter to include a patfrisk, the officer must have both a belief that the suspect is engaging in criminal activity and is armed and dangerous, thus if it started out as a consensual encounter, the officer must become reasonably suspicious not only the suspect is armed, but also that he intends to use the gun. Here, the SJC rejected the Appeals Court's four factor reasoning saying that it did not give the officer reasonable suspicion because (1) nothing in the defendant’s appearance suggested he had a gun, (2) the defendant was not known to be involved in criminal activity, (3) the defendant’s nervousness may have been reasonable considering his young age and inexperience dealing with police, (4) the defendant had every right to ignore the officer’s question and his silence could not be used to confer reasonable suspicion to the officer. The SJC also rejected the Commonwealth’s argument that the defendant’s act of pushing the officer’s hands away constituted a new intervening crime giving rise to probable cause to arrest him and that the completed patfrisk was an arrest.
