Com v. Williams, 5/21/10

Commonwealth v. Dwight Williams, May 21, 2010
456 Mass. 857

Motion to suppress, Disclosure of evidence, Discovery, Sentence, Comment by judge, Capital case. Evidence, Admissions and confessions,Hearsay, Authentication, Consciousness of guilt, Telephone conversation. Witness, Cross-examination. Evidence, Bias, Offer of proof. Constitutional Law, Admissions and confessions, Waiver of constitutional rights, Privacy. Homicide. Firearms. 

The defendant was convicted of murder in the first degree on a theory of deliberate premeditation, assault with a deadly weapon, assault with intent to commit murder, and unlawful possession of a firearm.  The defendant appealed the rulings on his motions to suppress statements, claimed two evidentiary errors, and four procedural errors including sentences beyond the statutory maximums for two of the charges.  The SJC agreed that the charges exceeded the statutory maximums and must be vacated, however the SJC rejected the defendant's other claims, affirmed his conviction, and remanded the case for resentencing.

Motion to Suppress; Miranda Waiver; Right to Use the Telephone

The defendant filed a motion to suppress statements made to police while he was being held at the Boston police station and then the Medford police station.  The defendant claims that despite the fact that he was read his Miranda rights before any questioning occurred and several times during the course of his interactions with police, that because he initially refused to sign the waiver form presented to him that all his statements and waivers made subsequent to this were invalid.  The defendant further contended that his statements were not made voluntarily because one of the officers said that the police would not speak to the defendant unless he signed the waiver forms as well as that the defendant should sign the forms in order to protect himself as well as the police.  The SJC stated that the defendant’s initial refusals to sign the waiver forms do not preclude a finding that his oral waiver was valid.  The SJC used a totality of circumstances test and by weighing the evidence presented noted that because the defendant had experience with the Miranda warnings having actually invoked his right to remain silent on at least one prior occasion and because he initiated the conversation with the police in Medford that his statements were both valid and voluntary.

The SJC also ruled that despite the fact that the defendant was not allowed to use the land line at the police station, but was instead given a cell phone to make three calls one of which was to an attorney, his right to use the telephone had not been violated.  G.L. c. 276 § 33a was most recently amended in 1963 which was before the invention of cell phones.  The court reasoned that the only difference being that the dialed numbers are automatically stored on a cell phone and aren’t on a land line is insignificant because in Massachusetts the police can record the number dialed by a defendant if using a police phone, the difference was insignificant and the defendant’s right to use the phone was not violated.

Admission of “Myspace” comments as evidence; Ineffectiveness of Counsel

The defendant argued that the court should not have allowed evidence into trial that was obtained by the defendant’s girlfriend in the form of MySpace comments left on her web page by what appeared to be the defendant’s Brother.  The SJC agreed that this evidence should not have been admitted because even though the comments were left by someone using the brother’s screen name and photo, it would be analogous to someone calling and claiming to be someone else with no evidence to show who really called.  The court determined however that the admission of this evidence was rendered insignificant by the testimony of two witnesses to the murder who identified the defendant as the shooter; therefore the admission was not grounds for reversal.  Furthermore the court rejected the defendant’s assertion that because of the failure to object to the MySpace comments as hearsay evidence his counsel was ineffective, the reason again being the overall insignificance of the evidence in the context of the case.

Admission of Firearm

The defendant argued that the firearm believed to be the murder weapon was found five days later in the possession of the defendant’s cousin, and was therefore not sufficiently linked to the killing.  The SJC ruled that the decision to admit the firearm is at the discretion of the trial judge and will not be reversed absent palpable error, which they did not find in this case.

Cross-Examination, Judicial Bias, and Sentencing

The defendant argues that the judge’s initial decision not to allow the defendant to question a witness for the prosecution about other charges he was facing not in connection with this murder, and any potential biases or deals he may have made violated his 6^th Amendment rights and violated article 12 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights.  The SJC ruled that although the judge initially denied this line of questioning, because he reconsidered and the defendant was eventually allowed to ask about the witness’s bias, no violation of rights had occurred.  Furthermore the court found that there was no judicial bias in this case despite a comment that was made by the judge, because the comment was not made in the presence of the jury and did not indicate an obvious bias on the part of the judge.  The SJC did however rule that the trial judge exceeded the statutory maximums for two of the charges the defendant was convicted of by 1 day each.  The SJC remanded for resentencing.