457 Mass. 24
Plea, Trial by jury, Waiver of trial by jury
In 1998, the defendant pleaded guilty in the District Court to multiple drug offenses. In 2005, the defendant moved to vacate his guilty pleas. The motions to vacate and motions for reconsideration were denied. The Appeals Court reversed and vacated the judgments, concluding that the defendant’s convictions were invalid because he did not sign a written waiver of his right to a jury trial in accordance with G. L. c. 263, § 6, and Mass. R. Crim. P. 19 (a), 378 Mass. 888 (1979). The SJC concluded that a written jury trial waiver is not required to enter a valid guilty plea, and affirmed the order denying the defendant’s motions to vacate his guilty pleas, as well as the orders denying the defendant’s motions for reconsideration.The defendant brought up two issues. (1) Whether the court can determine the defendant’s guilty plea was ‘knowing and voluntary’ in the absence of a written jury trial waiver. (2) Whether the absence of a written jury trial waiver violates G. L. c. 263, § 6, or rule 19 (a), and provides a basis to invalidate the defendant’s pleas.
Knowing and voluntary; colloquy
A guilty plea must be knowingly and voluntarily tendered by the defendant. Commonwealth v. Lopez, 447 Mass. 625, 628 (2006). “A defendant must be informed on the record of the three constitutional rights that are waived by a guilty plea: the right to trial by jury; the right to confront one’s accusers; and the privilege against self-incrimination.” Id. There is no requirement that, when accepting a defendant’s tender of a guilty plea, a defendant’s waiver of the right to a trial with or without a jury be in writing. In this case, the judge conducted a colloquy in court that informed the defendant about the consequences of entering a guilty plea, including a warning that by pleading guilty, a defendant is waiving the right to a jury trial. The SJC concluded that the colloquy reflected the defendant’s knowledge and voluntariness when waiving his rights.
G. L. c. 263, § 6; Mass. R. Crim. P. 19 (a); statutory interpretation
The SJC looked to G. L. c. 263, § 6 and interpreted it via its “ordinary lexical meaning.” Surrey v. Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co., 384 Mass. 171, 176 (1981). The statute does not by its terms apply to the tender of guilty pleas. The SJC looked to the stated timing of the written jury waivers referenced in the statute, and concluded that written waivers are required only when later fact-finding proceedings are necessary (ex. in bench trials).
The SJC next looked to the language of rule 19 (a). The SJC concluded that the rule, by its express terms, require written jury trial waivers only in circumstances where a defendant chooses a bench trial instead of a jury trial.
Knowing and voluntary; colloquy
A guilty plea must be knowingly and voluntarily tendered by the defendant. Commonwealth v. Lopez, 447 Mass. 625, 628 (2006). “A defendant must be informed on the record of the three constitutional rights that are waived by a guilty plea: the right to trial by jury; the right to confront one’s accusers; and the privilege against self-incrimination.” Id. There is no requirement that, when accepting a defendant’s tender of a guilty plea, a defendant’s waiver of the right to a trial with or without a jury be in writing. In this case, the judge conducted a colloquy in court that informed the defendant about the consequences of entering a guilty plea, including a warning that by pleading guilty, a defendant is waiving the right to a jury trial. The SJC concluded that the colloquy reflected the defendant’s knowledge and voluntariness when waiving his rights.
G. L. c. 263, § 6; Mass. R. Crim. P. 19 (a); statutory interpretation
The SJC looked to G. L. c. 263, § 6 and interpreted it via its “ordinary lexical meaning.” Surrey v. Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co., 384 Mass. 171, 176 (1981). The statute does not by its terms apply to the tender of guilty pleas. The SJC looked to the stated timing of the written jury waivers referenced in the statute, and concluded that written waivers are required only when later fact-finding proceedings are necessary (ex. in bench trials).
The SJC next looked to the language of rule 19 (a). The SJC concluded that the rule, by its express terms, require written jury trial waivers only in circumstances where a defendant chooses a bench trial instead of a jury trial.
