Commonwealth v. Kyle Sylvia, March 2, 201
456 Mass. 182
Opening Statement.
The defendant argued reversible error in the prosecutor’s opening statement, contending that the prosecutor made statements that were not later followed by supporting evidence and were not advanced in good faith. The prosecutor made the statements at issue in order to suggest possible defendant motives for the murder at issue. The SJC, reviewing to determine whether “any misconduct created a substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice,” found no error. The court found that the prosecutor’s suggestions of possible motive were all made in good faith, with the prosecutor reasonably expecting to elicit supporting testimony for each suggested motive during the trial. The SJC also noted, first, that the trial judge properly instructed the jury that nothing in the opening statements was to be taken as evidence and second, that the prosecutor’s statements should be viewed in context, wherein he was attempting to make the (legally correct) point that he does not need to prove motive.
Required Findings; Identification; Reliability.
The defendant contended that the trial judge erroneously denied his motion for a required finding of not guilty, made at the close of the Commonwealth’s case. The defendant argued that the prosecution’s proof was inadequate because the identification evidence was unreliable. The SJC rejected this argument and found sufficient Commonwealth evidence to prove identity. The court found, under the common-law principles of fairness, that the out-of-court identification evidence was sufficiently reliable and not impermissibly tainted by media coverage of the defendant because (i) the circumstances involved a “casual confrontation in neutral surroundings,” (ii) the media depictions of the defendant were different from how he actually appeared at the time, (iii) the judge instructed on eyewitness identification testimony and (iv) the witnesses were subject to cross-examination. The court also found that the in-court identification evidence was adequate; the briefness of witness encounters with the defendant or certain lacking details were for the jury to consider and weigh.
Scientific Testing; Relevance.
The defendant argued that testimony of the Commonwealth’s chemist regarding gunshot power residue test results, and the prosecutor’s use of that testimony during his closing argument, should have been excluded as irrelevant and unduly prejudicial. Specifically, the chemist testified that gunshot power residue is detected in twenty to twenty-five per cent of gunshot power residue collection kits analyzed. The SJC rejected the defendant’s contention of error. The court found that because the defendant had raised the issue of contamination of the gunshot powder with a previous witness, it was reasonable for the prosecutor to believe that the issue of contamination might be raised on cross-examination of the chemist. The challenged testimony was relevant to providing a statistical context in which the jury could evaluate the contamination issue. The court also found that although the prosecutor began to use the challenged testimony in a potentially unduly prejudicial manner during his closing, the trial judge immediately interrupted him and properly instructed the jury, thus not creating any reversible error.
Closing Statement.
The defendant argued that the prosecutor made several improper remarks during his closing argument: (i) remarks consisting of a personal observation or belief (use of “I know”), (ii) reference to defendant’s argument and police action, and (iii) an isolated reference to hearsay testimony. The SJC rejected defendant’s contention of reversible error. The court first noted that the trial court had properly instructed the jury that the closing arguments are not evidence both before the closing arguments and in the final instructions to the jury. Second, the SJC found that each of the challenged remarks, when considered in the context of the prosecutor’s whole argument and with judicial intervention and curative instruction, were not unduly prejudicial as to require reversal.
Inconsistent Verdicts.
The defendant contended that his convictions of murder in the first degree and of unlawful possession of a firearm were inconsistent with his acquittal on the charge of wearing body armor during the commission of a felony, and thus must be reversed. The SJC rejected this argument, finding that the defendant argued factually inconsistent (not legally inconsistent) verdicts returned by the jury. Factually inconsistent verdicts do not entitle a defendant to relief. The court went further, stating that they did not find the verdicts to be factually inconsistent.
