DISCLAIMER:

These summaries of case decisions are intended for informational purposes only. They are not intended to be interpretations of the law, nor do they encompass the subtleties of each case. Therefore, reference to the original text is indispensable.



Tuesday, March 30, 2010

City Sanitation v. Beck, 3/30/10

City Sanitation vs. Christopher Beck and another, March 30, 2010

Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Personal Jurisdiction


Facts
The plaintiff “City” brought a suit alleging conversion of his truck engine, stating that the defendant’s brother, while in possession of City’s truck, removed its engine and put it into a truck owned by the defendant “Christopher”.  Christopher denied owning the truck or that the motor was actually switched, and moved pursuant to Mass. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(2) that the case against him be dismissed for lack of personal jurisdiction.  Christopher is a resident of Rhode Island, and the other defendant is his company which is incorporated in Rhode Island and has its principle place of business there.  The trial judge ordered the case dismissed for lack of personal jurisdiction and the Appellate Division affirmed that order.


Personal Jurisdiction
Although Christopher contends that he was not the owner of the truck, and had already sold it to Robert before the alleged conversion occurred, the court analyzed the situation assuming a conversion.  If a conversion occurred, personal jurisdiction over the defendants must still be found before the case can proceed in Massachusetts.  In order for this to happen the exercise of personal jurisdiction must be authorized by the Massachusetts long-arm statute, and the exercise of jurisdiction must be consistent with basic due process requirements mandated by the United States Constitution. 

The pertinent part of the statute states that personal jurisdiction may be exercised over a defendant who caused tortuous injury by act or omission in the Commonwealth.  For this to be satisfied either the defendant had to come into Massachusetts and physically remove the truck, or the defendant’s brother Robert must have been acting as his agent.  Because neither scenario has been proven or even alleged in this case, and the only information the plaintiff had is that Christopher at one time owned the truck with City’s engine currently in it, the Appellate Division stated that there is no uncontroverted evidence that Christopher engaged in a conversion at all, let alone one in the Commonwealth.  The court did not have to analyze whether personal jurisdiction would be constitutional, but did state that in the present case Christopher’s contacts with the Commonwealth would be less than minimal, or even non-existent.  Order dismissing for lack of personal jurisdiction was affirmed.


- Prepared by AEK