DISCLAIMER:

These summaries of case decisions are intended for informational purposes only. They are not intended to be interpretations of the law, nor do they encompass the subtleties of each case. Therefore, reference to the original text is indispensable.



Tuesday, March 2, 2010

Com v. Mathis, 3/2/10

Commonwealth v. Ronald Mathis, March 2, 2010
76 Mass. App. Ct. 366

Search and Seizure, Investigatory Stop, Probable Cause

The defendant argued on appeal that the judge erred in the denial of his motion to suppress the drugs. The Appeals Court, in a split decision, affirmed the conviction.

Boston police patrolling in an unmarked cruiser saw the defendant standing in front of a building bearing a “no trespassing”sign. The officers, while seated in their cruiser, asked the defendant the purpose of his presence. He stated his mother lived in the building. They then asked for documentary identification and ran a warrant check. The defendant was breathing heavily, stuttering, and “couldn’t get his words out right.” There were no warrants. The officers returned the identification and asked the defendant if he had anything on him they should know about. He responded, “a bag of weed.” The officers got out of the cruiser, noticed the defendant was avoiding eye contact, and had made several attempts to put his hands in his pocket. Several plastic vials of crack cocaine fell from the defendant’s pocket during a pat frisk.

The majority decision stated that the officers approach of the defendant and request for identification was not a seizure. The request was made in a reasonable and conversational tone, without a show of authority. The majority acknowledged that once the police had possession of the defendant’s identification, the defendant may have been seized. The return of the defendant’s identification, however, ended any seizure. The majority went on to state that even if the return of the identification, (once the police determined the defendant had no warrants) did not terminate the seizure, the defendant’s behavior at the scene provided a reasonable suspicion to prompt the question asked by the police.

The dissent stated the encounter should have ended once the defendant gave the reasonable explanation for his presence. The dissent continued that the defendant was not free to go once the police took his identification and impermissibly used that opportunity not only to run a warrant check but also to question him. The fact that the last question took place after the police returned the identification was “overly formalistic” to conclude that a reasonable person would have believe he was free to leave.