Com v. Matos

Commonwealth v. Diana Matos

Massachusetts Appeals Court

January 11, 2011

Docket No: 09-P-1895

Prostitution, Inducing a minor

The primary issue in this case was whether G.L. c. 272, § 4A, which makes it a penalty to induce a minor to become a prostitute, requires a showing that the minor was not previously involved with prostitution prior to a defendant convicted under this statute.  The defendant also appealed her convictions on other charges based upon a lack of sufficient evidence.

Facts

Malden police detectives planned a sting operation directed at uncovering prostitution at a local hotel.  Detective DiSalvatore pretended to be a customer, contacted a person soliciting sexual services from the internet site “Craigslist” at around 8:30 P.M.  This individual, later identified as B.C., had been living on the streets during the preceding week, had run away from a halfway home, and planned on making money by engaging in prostitution, which she had been doing for “a while.” 

After receiving the phone call, B.C. received a ride from the defendant, Diana Matos, and her boyfriend, a co-defendant, to the hotel for the purposes of engaging in prostitution.  The defendant held onto B.C.’s identifying documents such as her birth certificate and social security card and told her to call when B.C. confirmed everything was “okay.”  The entire sting operation went as planned, with Detective DiSalvatore gaining sufficient evidence to prove prostitution charges against B.C. and the defendant.  The detective then gave B.C. a false reason to leave the hotel and return in a hour.  Malden police arrested B.C. and the co-defendants after they returned to the hotel and picked up B.C. 

Issue:  Under G.L. c. 272, § 4A, does the Commonwealth have to prove that a minor was not previously involved with prostitution?

The relevant statute is as follows: “Whoever induces a minor to become a prostitute, or who knowingly aids and assists in such inducement, shall be punished…”  The Commonwealth argued that the language should be read to prohibit conduct that induced a minor to engage in prostitution, thus not requiring the showing that the minor had previously not engaged in prostitution.

Analyzing the statute in its plain meaning, the Appeals Court explained that following the Commonwealth’s argument would require ignoring the phrase “to become a prostitute” and replace it with “to engage in an act of prostitution.”  Given this, the court found that the statute makes clear through its language that it aims to punish those individuals who induce a minor, who is not then engaged, into prostitution.  A defendant cannot use an individual’s past acts involving prostitution as an ultimate defense against this charge because the court made it clear that “prostitution” refers to specific conduct, which a person may cease to engage in at any time, and not a label that stays with someone forever.

Due to this implicit requirement of the statute, the court reversed the defendants charge under this section because there is sufficient evidence, including B.C.’s own testimony, that she had already resumed prostitution during the week preceding the interaction with the undercover detective. 

Issue 2:  Was there sufficient evidence for the defendant’s other convictions?

Defendant argued that the evidence was insufficient to convict her of violating G.L. c. 272, § 7, which prohibits deriving support or maintenance from the earnings or proceeds stemming from prostitution and G.L. c. 119, § 64, which prohibits contributing to the delinquency of a minor.  The court found that there was sufficient evidence for these convictions because the defendant drove B.C. to the hotel, held B.C.’s important documents, and waited to confirm B.C.’s safety once in the hotel.  All these circumstances provide the basis for a reasonable jury to infer both convictions.

Judgments Affirmed.

Prepared by AAO