Commonwealth v. Jose Arnaut
Massachusetts Appeals Court
January 5, 2011
Docket No: 09-P-1872
Retroactivity of Judicial Holding, Motion for New Trial
The defendant appeals from his 2004 conviction on multiple drug charges, alleging that the denial of his second motion for a new trial was wrongfully denied. Defendant argues that Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 129 S. Ct. 2527 (2009) should be applied retroactively to a case pending on collateral review.
Facts
While the defendant's direct appeal was pending, the United States Supreme Court decided Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004). In interpreting this decision, the Supreme Judicial Court held in Commonwealth v. Verde, 444 Mass. 279, 283-84 (2005), that certificates of drug analysis were not testimonial statements within the meaning of Crawford. The Appeals Court in 2008 denied the defendant's later appeal from his 2007 pro se motion for new trial. After this rejection, the Supreme Court held that such certificates are testimonial and trigger Confrontation Clause protections in Melendez-Diaz. The defendant filed his second motion for a new trial two months after this decision, arguing for the first time that the admission of the certificates at his trial was in error and that trial and appellate counsel were ineffective for raising such claims. The Appeals Court denied his motion, to which the defendant appealed once again.
Issue: Should this new rule of law be applied retroactively to this case on collateral review?
The Appeals Court concludes that the defendant is not entitled on collateral review to the application of the Melendez-Diaz ruling because the exceptions to the general rule regarding when a new rule of law shall be applied retroactively do not apply. Under Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989) and Commonwealth v. Amirault, 424 Mass. 618 (1997), new rules of law should not be applied retroactively unless the situation falls into one of two exceptions.
The first of these exceptions is when the new rule is substantive and makes certain conduct out of the reach of criminality. Amirault, 424 Mass. at 638. This does not apply because the defendant was found guilty on multiple drug offenses that have not been deemed legal and out of the reach of criminal-law making authority.
The second exception is when a new rule of law address a procedure of "fundamental fairness" and one "without which the likelihood of an accurate conviction is seriously diminished." Id. This exception also does not apply because the Supreme Court determined in Whorton v. Bockting, 549 U.S. 406, 416-21 (2007) that the Crawford ruling did not meet the threshold of this second exception. The Appeals Court thus assumes that because Melendez is based upon Crawford, it is subject to the same interpretation as to whether it meets the threshold of the second exception. Therefore, the Melendez ruling does not meet the requirement of any exceptions and the denial of the defendant's second motion for a new trial is correct.
Judgments affirmed.
Prepared by AAO
