Commonwealth v. Paul J. Tlasek (No. 1), July 22, 2010
Assistance of Counsel, Waiver of Constitutional Rights
After a jury trial in the Superior Court, the defendant was convicted of trafficking in cocaine, and trafficking in cocaine in a school zone. The Appeals Court reversed these convictions in accordance with Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 129 S.Ct. 2527 (2009). The reasoning for the reversals are contained in a companion memorandum. For purposes of a potential retrial, the Appeals Court separately addressed an evidentiary claim in this opinion. The defendant argued that incriminating statements he made to the Canton police should have been suppressed as a violation of his right to counsel under the 6th Amendment to the US Constitution. The Appeals Court affirmed the denial of the defendant's motion to suppress.
Facts
On April 4, 2007, a Canton detective informed the Brockton police that the defendant was the prime suspect in a Canton housebreak. Based on this information, Brockton police arrested the defendant at his Brockton address on two outstanding arrest warrants. Police had to use force to subdue the defendant. During the struggle, the defendant became bloodied and his shirt was torn off. The police asked the defendant if he wanted a new shirt. The defendant said, “yeah,” and indicated in which bedroom a shirt could be found. While retrieving the shirt, Brockton police spotted 3 plastic bags containing what appeared to be crack cocaine lying in an open dresser drawer. They charged the defendant with the drug offenses, and counsel was appointed. Inside the defendant's apartment, Brockton police saw the goods allegedly stolen during the Canton housebreak. Canton police obtained and executed a search warrant on the apartment.
While the defendant remained in custody, but before he had been arraigned on the Canton housebreak, the Canton police came to interview him at the house of correction. The defendant was read his Miranda rights, and he signed a standard Miranda waiver form before the interview with the Canton police began. The interview questioned the defendant about his ties to the Brockton apartment where the drugs and stolen goods were found. The defendant denied living there. When the Canton police confronted him with the fact that two named individuals had told them that the defendant lived there, the defendant interjected that one of the individuals “was a scumbag and that after [the police] had left his residence, [that individual] had gone back in and stolen his dresser and the tv that had been left behind.” The defendant realized his error and terminated the interview. At trial, the Commonwealth introduced the defendant‟s statements as proof that the alleged drugs found in the dresser were his.
Under Montejo v. Louisiana, 129 S.Ct. 2079, 2091 (2009), a valid Miranda waiver suffices to waive one's 6th Amendment right to counsel. This overturns Michigan v. Jackson, 475 U.S. 625, 636 (1986), holding that, if police initiate interrogation after a defendant's assertion of his right to counsel, any waiver of the defendant's right to counsel for that police-initiated interrogation is invalid.
Here, the defendant was read his Miranda rights, and he signed a standard Miranda waiver form. There was no error in the motion judge's conclusion that this was a valid Miranda waiver. In accordance with Montejo, the defendant waived his 6th Amendment right to counsel when he agreed to speak with the Canton police.
Defendant's waiver of his 6th Amendment right does not mean that he necessarily waived his parallel right under art. 12 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights. On appeal, the defendant relied entirely on the 6th Amendment in arguing statement suppression. The Appeals Court concluded the issue of whether the defendant waived his art. 12 right to counsel and whether the Canton police interview infringed upon that right, were not before the court.
The Appeals Court affirmed the denial of the defendant's motion to suppress. For reasons stated in the companion memorandum and order Commonwealth v. Tlasek (No. 2), post _____ (2010), the judgments on indictments charging trafficking in a controlled substance, and trafficking in a controlled substance in a school zone, were reversed, and the verdicts set aside. The judgment on the indictment charging resisting arrest was affirmed.
- Prepared by AYK
