Commonwealth v. Joann Sliech-Brodeur, July 19, 2010
Plain View, Search and Seizure, Discovery Orders and Mass. R. Crim. P. 14(b)(2), Jury Instructions, Daubert-Lanigan Hearing, Evidentiary Rulings
The defendant was found guilty of murder in the first degree of her husband on theories of deliberate premeditation and extreme atrocity or cruelty. The defendant appealed her conviction by challenging a denial of her motion to suppress evidence, the scope of discovery orders granted on motion to the commonwealth concerning her defense of lack of criminal responsibility, and a number of rulings by the trial judge. The SJC stated that the defendant’s motion to suppress was properly denied but that the discovery orders violated Mass. R. Crim. P. 14(b)(2), as appearing in 442 Mass. 1518 (2004). These discovery orders resulted in prejudice to the defendant, and thus the SJC reversed the conviction and ordered a new trial.
Facts
The defendant was the victim’s husband, and they lived together for most of the year in Springfield, MA, and spent the summers in Florida. The defendant and the victim were both divorcees from previous marriages and had kids from those marriages. Both the victim and defendant had been telling their children that a divorce was imminent based on various troubles and arguments in the marriage.
On the night of July 28, 2004 the defendant telephoned her son and said he needed to come to her house because something awful had happened. When the son arrived with his girlfriend, they called the police after seeing the scene. The victim had died as a result of blood loss from a few of the 34 separate stab wounds on his body. There was blood throughout the house from the bedroom to the living room, where the victim’s body lay on the floor covered by a sheet.
When officers arrived they were told that the defendant may have overdosed on medication in an attempt to commit suicide. The defendant told the paramedic that she had a history of depression and fibromyalgia and that she wanted to kill herself, but the defendant seemed coherent and alert during the motor and verbal test given by the ambulance personnel.
During a subsequent search of the defendant’s home, police noticed a couple ladies rings, a large kitchen knife, and a crow bar next to a sink, and observed blood in the sink and throughout the house. While photographing the scene and collecting evidence police noticed a letter on a kitchen counter as well as 22 small yellow post-it notes attached possessions in the property, and written on each note was the name of one of the defendant’s children and each was signed by the defendant.
Prior to trial the defendant announced her intention to submit a defense of not criminally responsible and the name of the expert witness (Dr. Brown) they intended to call to testify about the defendant’s mental state at the time of the crime. The Commonwealth moved to have their own expert (Dr. Kelly) interview the defendant, to which the defendant had no objection. However the Commonwealth also asked for, and received over objection from the defendant, almost 200 pages of notes and theories recorded by Dr. Brown during roughly 30 hours of interview sessions with the defendant. Dr. Kelly then based his testimony and report in part on the notes he reviewed from the other expert, including notes entitled, “Joann Sliech-Brodeur's alleged memory of incident”.
Motion to Suppress Evidence, Plain View
Prior to trial the defendant moved for the suppression of the letter as well as the notes that were collected from the home. After an evidentiary hearing the motion judge denied the motion to suppress stating that although the warrant did not expressly authorize the search and seizure of documents, the evidence was in plain view of the officers conducting a valid search pursuant to a warrant.
The SJC stated that when a search warrant does not expressly authorize the seizure of documents, the seizure of those documents is presumptively unreasonable, and the commonwealth bears the burden of demonstrating that an exception to the warrant requirement applies. The Commonwealth argued that the objects were in plain view, and the SJC agreed. The defendant on appeal conceded that the first requirement of the plain view doctrine, that the officers be in a position to view the documents and had access to them was satisfied, but that the officers had no reason to read any of the documents, the documents were not immediately incriminating on their face, and finally that the officers did not discover the items inadvertently.
The SJC stated that even though the warrant did not authorize the officers to search or seize documents, it would be unreasonable to expect them to ignore what is immediately in front of them. The SJC further stated that based on the cursory reading of the documents that was allowed, although the incriminating nature of the documents might not have been “immediately apparent”, in light of what was known at the time the officer could have “plausibly related to criminal activity of which he was already aware”. And lastly the SJC stated that they had no reason to disagree with the motion judge’s crediting the detective’s testimony that when he went through the crime scene initially he did not notice the letters or notes, and thus the finding of those documents was inadvertent.
Discovery Orders
The defendant next argued that the pretrial discovery orders, compelling the production of her statements and Dr. Brown's notes and testing materials to Dr. Kelly before trial was improper for several reasons including the discovery provisions of rule 14 (b) (2). The SJC agreed with the defendant that the discovery orders permitting Dr. Kelly to receive Dr. Brown's materials contravened the constitutionally based limitations on discovery related to a defense of lack of criminal responsibility pursuant to rule 14 (b) (2), and did not consider any of the defendant’s other contentions related to this issue.
The defendant next argued that the pretrial discovery orders, compelling the production of her statements and Dr. Brown's notes and testing materials to Dr. Kelly before trial was improper for several reasons including the discovery provisions of rule 14 (b) (2). The SJC agreed with the defendant that the discovery orders permitting Dr. Kelly to receive Dr. Brown's materials contravened the constitutionally based limitations on discovery related to a defense of lack of criminal responsibility pursuant to rule 14 (b) (2), and did not consider any of the defendant’s other contentions related to this issue.
The SJC discussed their ruling in Blaisdell, and how it was subsequently codified in to rule 14 (b) (2). Under this rule, when a defendant notifies the court that she intends to offer expert opinion testimony based on her own statements about her mental condition at the time of the crime, a judge may order her to submit to a psychiatric examination on the prosecutor's motion or the judge's order. Next, the appointed examiner must file a written report containing his or her findings about the defendant's mental condition at the time of the crime and if the report contains or is based on testimonial statements of the defendant fitting within the scope of the privilege against self-incrimination the report may not be made available to either party unless the defendant moves to make it available, or "during trial" the defendant raises a defense of lack of criminal responsibility and satisfies the judge that she intends either to testify herself or call an expert witness who will testify based on her statements.
The Majority of the SJC reads this rule as very limiting, in that it only authorizes the Commonwealth to conduct an examination with their own expert and does not entitle them to anything more. Furthermore the court noted that the documents were given to Dr. Kelly and then the prosecution before cross examination also resulted in prejudice to the defendant. However, the court noted that in keeping with the trend toward mutual disclosure, it is appropriate to modify, for criminal cases commenced after the date of this opinion, the procedures set out in rule 14 (b) (2) to require the defendant's expert to produce to the prosecution a report that includes the defense expert's opinion and the bases and reasons for this opinion.
There were two separate dissents written in this case, and the thrust of each was basically that the Commonwealth was entitled to the statements made to Dr. Brown as well as his notes from the interviews, and not just his final report and conclusions. Justices Gants and Cowin also stated that the fact that the Dr. Kelly got Dr. Brown’s notes too early should not have justified reversal because if the error was just the timing it was not prejudicial error, and they also disagreed with the majority’s interpretation of rule 14 as a whole.
The court also discussed several issues that might rise at retrial including:
Jury Instructions
The defendant argued the judge should have given a definition of “Mental disease or defect”. The SJC stated that although in a case like this it might have been helpful and would have been allowable, it was within the judge’s discretion not to give such an instruction.
Daubert-Lanigan Hearing
The defendant argued that the court should have held a Daubert-Lanigan hearing to assess the scientific validity of the state’s expert Dr. Kelly’s conclusions about the defendant’s mental state and his methods. The SJC stated that it may be necessary for a judge to determine whether the opinion testimony of an expert witness is sufficiently reliable, it does not mean a separate hearing must be held. The SJC also agreed that psychiatric evaluations and interviewers may be subject to these hearings, but will not be necessary in cases where the expert’s methodology has been previously accepted as reliable in the relevant field. Because the judge was justified in considering what he did, including Dr. Kelly’s testimony in roughly 200 other Massachusetts cases, there was no error in refusing to hold a separate hearing.
Evidentiary Rulings
The SJC stated that it was error for the judge to allow testimony from the defendant’s long time attorney (who had actually represented the defendant at the early stages of the murder trial, and in her pending divorce proceedings) about why no court ordered psychiatric evaluation had taken place earlier. The SJC stated that this was improper because just as an attorney’s opinion regarding their client’s truthfulness is subject to attorney-client privilege, so are their impressions regarding their client’s sanity.
The SJC stated that it was error for the judge to allow testimony from the defendant’s long time attorney (who had actually represented the defendant at the early stages of the murder trial, and in her pending divorce proceedings) about why no court ordered psychiatric evaluation had taken place earlier. The SJC stated that this was improper because just as an attorney’s opinion regarding their client’s truthfulness is subject to attorney-client privilege, so are their impressions regarding their client’s sanity.
The SJC also stated that the judge should not have sustained the objection to Dr. Brown’s explanation of how the fact that the victim had been stabbed 34 times weighed on his psychiatric evaluation of the defendant’s mental capacity. Because a defendant’s expert in a criminal responsibility case is entitled to testify broadly about mental capacity, opinion about the stab wounds supporting his view that the defendant was suffering a dissociative mental state was permissible.
Finally the SJC also stated that it was error for the prosecutor to ask three lay witnesses whether the defendant ever showed “Overt signs of mental illness” because they were not qualified to give such an opinion.
Conclusion
The SJC reversed the conviction and set aside the verdict, and remanded the case to the Superior Court for a new trial.
-Prepared by AEK
-Prepared by AEK
