Commonwealth vs. Lord Hampton, June 30, 2010
Motion to Suppress Statement due to Failure to permit use of Telephone. Jury Issues, Structural Error, Due Process, Criminal Record Checks of Jurors
The defendant was convicted of the September 28, 1999, murders of a fourteen-year old girl (victim) and her eight-month old fetus, both on theories of deliberate premeditation and extreme atrocity or cruelty. On appeal he asserts error in the denial of his motion to suppress the statement he gave to Boston police, allegedly because they violated his right under G.L. c. 276, § 33A, to make a telephone call; and in the denial of his request to obtain criminal records of jurors after the Commonwealth obtained criminal records of four jurors and after the jury were sworn. We affirm the convictions and decline to grant relief under G.L. 278, § 33E.
Facts
Facts
An investigation led police to a site on the grounds of the former Boston State Hospital, where they unearthed the victim's body from a grave approximately twenty-eight inches deep. Autopsy testimony revealed that the victim died from multiple stab wounds and suffocation from being buried alive. Her fetus died as a result of asphyxia after the mother’s death.
The defendant was questioned at Boston police headquarters, where he gave a tape-recorded statement in which he described his assistance in the killings. The statement essentially was that a long-time friend of his would be the father of the victim’s baby, and that he wanted help killing the victim in order to prevent his being found guilty of statutory rape when the child was born. The statement detailed where the killing was to take place and the planning his friend put into the murder. The defendant also described how the murder had taken place as he was near the killing but denied that he stabbed the girl or helped bury her. The defendant did however admit to dropping a knife near the grave before the murder, and that he threw the shovel that buried the girl into some bushes before they left.
The final part of the statement informed officers that he had discussed the murder with another person after it happened. At trial there were two people that testified that the defendant discussed the murder with them, and one said the defendant admitted to the murder and the other said the defendant admitted only to being there and his friend committed the murder. The defendant testified at trial and denied any involvement in the victim's death. He said he made the statement to police because he believed that was what they wanted to hear, and he just wanted to go home.
Motion to Suppress Evidence, Telephone Use
Motion to Suppress Evidence, Telephone Use
The defendant argues that because the arrest report and the booking report indicate that the defendant was arrested at 1030am on the Morning of November 4th, that his statement was taken around noon of that day, and that he was not permitted to make a phone call until after 4pm that afternoon. The defendant argues because he was not allowed his phone call within an hour after his arrest his statement should have been suppressed. The SJC rejected that argument, agreeing with the trial judge’s finding of fact that the time recorded as 10:30am for the defendant’s arrest was a mistake, and that he was not arrested until after permission had been received from the DA’s office after the tape recorded interview occurred.
The SJC found that even if the defendant was not advised of his right to use a telephone within an hour after his arrest, the defendant failed to meet the burden of showing that the officers intentionally denied him this right. Furthermore, the defendant acknowledged, and the interviewing detective also testified that the interview and Miranda warnings given before the statement was prior to the actual arrest, and the defendant wanted to make a statement to avoid being arrested. The SJC concluded that even if the defendant was denied the right to use the call it occurred after the statement was made, and also concluded that the trial judge’s finding that the defendant was not actually under arrest until after the interview was valid.
Jury Issues
A jury of 18 members was selected by agreement of the parties. The selection process took five days and at the end of the process the judge informed the jury of their obligations including to not discuss the case with anyone else including the other jury members until it was time to deliberate. The opening statements and the playing of the defendant’s tape-recorded statement occurred on the next day. The following day the court officer overheard “Juror A” telling the other jurors about a picture of the jurors that appeared on the cover of a newspaper he saw someone on the train reading. The court officer asked Juror A not to discuss it further and brought the matter to the judge’s attention.
After informing the attorneys of this the prosecutor told the judge that based on the “facial reactions” of some of the younger jurors after the prior day’s proceedings that he had performed criminal background checks on those jurors and that Juror A failed to disclose a prior criminal history and that Juror B’s husband was facing charges. The prosecutor asked that the judge remove those jurors for cause. The defense counsel objected to the removal and requested copies of all background checks the prosecutor performed and requested that the court order CORI checks for all the jurors. The court denied that request and after a voir dire with each member of the jury found that 17, including juror be were acceptable and had not been biased. The judge did dismiss Juror A, not for his failure to disclose a past criminal history, but for violating the judge’s order not to discuss any aspect of the case with any other member of the jury.
Structural Error
The defendant contended that a failure of the court to provide him with the CORI records of prospective jurors constituted a structural error because it was a denial of fundamental fairness under the due process clauses of the Federal and Massachusetts Constitutions, and undermined his right to an impartial jury. The SJC analyzed this argument by noting that a structural error is an error that necessarily renders the proceeding unfair or unreliable and would require immediate reversal. Typically for structural error to be found the defendant needs to show that one or more of the jurors were actually biased. The court noted however that in Massachusetts the denial of a defendant’s peremptory challenge has a long history of being considered structural error and that is the main type of process error that would be structural. The court noted that CORI requests do not have such a history, and that in Massachusetts failure to provide those records does not constitute structural error if the defendant cannot prove that one of the jurors was actually biased. Therefore the SJC rejected this part of the defendant’s argument.
Due Process
The court rejected this argument of the defendant for many reasons. First was that the judge and prosecutor did not actually reopen the jury selection process with the CORI checks and dismissal of the juror. Apart from the jury selection process the court noted a judge has “discretionary authority to dismiss a juror at any time in the best interests of justice”. G.L. c. 234A, § 39. The judge dismissed Juror A not because of the CORI check but because of his violation of court orders. The SJC further concluded that because jury selection had been concluded, the defendant was not entitled to move for jurors' CORI records at that time, and the judge did not err in denying his request. The court also found that even if there was error the defendant has failed to show any actual bias and thus any harm suffered.
Rule on Ability to Conduct CORI checks of Potential Jurors
The final decision made in connection with this case was the SJC’s holding with regard to when CORI checks may be requested of potential jurors.
“To avoid the risks arising from inquiries into the backgrounds of empanelled jurors, we hold that, in all criminal trials commencing after the issuance of the rescript in this case, a prosecutor's independent authority to conduct checks of jurors' CORI records under G.L. c. 6, § 172, to determine if a juror failed to disclose his or her criminal record during voir dire, without the judge's approval, ends once the jury have been sworn. If the prosecutor, cognizant of the time needed to conduct the checks of prospective jurors' CORI records, does not wish to delay the jury from being sworn by waiting for the completion of such checks, or if the judge will not delay the commencement of trial until such checks are completed, the prosecutor may reserve an entitlement to conduct a check of jurors' CORI records by declaring that he or she is content with the jury, subject to the results of such checks, which the prosecutor will cause to be completed immediately, no later than the beginning of the next trial day. After the jury is sworn, unless the prosecutor has reserved an entitlement to conduct such a check, any check of CORI records or other inquiry into juror misconduct, whether sought by the prosecution or the defendant, may be done only with the approval of the trial judge. We add that the same procedure applies to any investigation of jurors that may be conducted by the defense.”
- Prepared by AEK
