Commonwealth v. Valentine J. Rodriguez, April 27, 2010
456 Mass. 578
Required Finding; Motion to Suppress; Affidavit; Presumptions and Burden of Proof; Confrontation of Witnesses; Search and Seizure; Certificate of Drug Analysis; Expert Opinion
The defendant was convicted of (1) distribution of cocaine, (2) possession of cocaine, and (3) distribution of cocaine within one hundred feet of a public park. The Appeals Court reversed the judgments of conviction, set aside the verdicts, and remanded the case after concluding that the motion judge erred in denying the defendant’s motion to suppress. The SJC concluded that the evidence was insufficient as a matter of law to warrant a guilty finding on the 2 distribution counts and directed that a judgment of acquittal be entered on those counts. The SJC reversed the judgment of conviction of possession of cocaine, on different grounds than that of the Appeals Court, and remanded the case for a new suppression hearing and trial.
A police officer sitting in an unmarked car observed a woman (Rivera) meet the defendant in a park. Rivera and the defendant walked to the courtyard of a residence and met with a man. The three walked into the building and were out of view of the officer. The defendant and River then left the building and returned to the park. The detective observed the defendant reach into his pocket, hold out his left hand with the palm up, put his right hand into his palm, and hand something to Rivera. The detective approached Rivera after she walked away from the defendant. When Rivera saw the detective, she threw an object to the ground, which the detective retrieved. The object was a one dollar bill containing a hard, off-white substance. After retrieving this object, he radioed to fellow officers of the drug control unit who were in the area, saying, “It’s a Saturday. Arrest that guy” (referring to the defendant). The detective explained to the jury that “[a] Saturday is a term used in the drug control unit when we recover drugs off the buyer.”
After the radio communication, two other officers approached the defendant while he was alone in the park. When they were nearly beside him, the defendant dropped an object that was in his hand. An officer picked up the hard, off-white substance.
Two certificates of drug analysis were admitted in evidence, one certifying that the substance in the one dollar bill contained cocaine, and the other certifying that the “loose substance” retrieved near the defendant contained cocaine.
Sufficiency of the Evidence
The trial judge denied the defendant’s motion for required findings of not guilty. The SJC concluded that a rational jury could have found that there was probable cause to believe the defendant distributed the cocaine that Rivera threw to the ground, but could not have found the defendant guilty of distribution beyond a reasonable doubt. Alternatives to the distribution theory, such as the possibility that the defendant and Rivera had both gone into the residence to purchase for their own use, and that the defendant had passed to Rivera something other than cocaine, were plausible enough to yield reasonable doubt. The defendant’s hand movements as he handed something to Rivera, as observed by the detective, were inconsistent with that of wrapping cocaine within a one dollar bill. The supposition that Rivera had wrapped the cocaine in a one dollar bill while the detective watched her was pure conjecture.
The SJC held that where there are two alleged sequential transactions in which the transfer of drugs was not witnessed, the Commonwealth must present evidence sufficient to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant during the second transaction distributed the drugs found in the possession of Rivera. Because the inferences from the evidence were too weak to permit a rational jury to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant distributed the cocaine in the dollar bill to Rivera, the SJC reversed the judgments of the distribution convictions.
Motion to Suppress
Defendant had filed a motion to suppress, claiming that he was stopped without reasonable suspicion and arrested without probable cause. The trial judge ruled that the drugs were not seized from the defendant because they were not found on him, and denied the suppression motion. The SJC held that the finding of fact (that the drugs were not found on the defendant’s person) was based on the oral representation of the prosecutor and not on the evidence at the hearing. The ruling of law was also erroneous; however, if the defendant dropped the drugs before he was stopped, then the drugs could not be the fruit of the seizure, and would not be subject to suppression regardless of the constituionaly of the subsequent stop. Because no evidence regarding the timing of the stop of the defendant in relation to the dropping of the drugs on the ground, the court could not assess whether the drugs on the ground were the fruit of the stop. There was also no evidence regarding the timing of the stop of the defendant in relation to the retrieval of the drugs dropped on the ground by Rivera; therefore, the court could not assess whether the defendant’s stop was supported by reasonable suspicion.
In a suppression motion alleging an unconstitutional search or seizure, (1) the detail in the motion and accompanying affidavit must be sufficient to enable a judge to determine whether to conduct an evidentiary hearing; and (2) the affidavit must be sufficiently detailed to give fair notice to the prosecution of the particular search or seizure that the defendant is challenging, so that the prosecution may determine which witnesses it should call and what evidence it should offer to meet its burden of proving probable cause, reasonable suspicion, or consent. Costa v. Commonwealth.
Here, the SJC found a lack of detail in the defendant’s motion and affidavit. The SJC concluded that appropriate action in this case was to vacate the judge’s denial of the motion to suppress, as well as her findings of fact and conclusion of law, and remand for a new motion hearing.
Certificate of drug analysis
The defendant argued that the admission of the drug certificates regarding the substance found next to him, without testimony by the analyst who conducted the testing, violated his 6th Amendment confrontation rights. In light of Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 127 S. Ct. 2527 (2009), the SJC held that it was error to admit the certificate. The issue is whether the admission of the certificate was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
Here, no independent evidence was presented to establish the composition of the substances and the Commonwealth relied solely on the certificate to prove that the substance was cocaine. The Commonwealth failed to establish that the error in admitting the certificate was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. The SJC reversed the judgment of conviction and remanded for a new trial.
It’s a Saturday
The SJC held that admission of the statement, “it’s a Saturday,” with the accompanying explanation that “Saturday” is the code word used by police officers when they recover drugs from the buyer, was evidence. Through this testimony, the detective offered his opinion that Rivera had bought cocaine from the defendant. Because his opinion would not be admissible if directly asked for it, it is not admissible through the use of a less direct statement.
In sum, the evidence was insufficient to support the distribution convictions and the SJC ordered that acquittal judgments be entered on those charges. The SJC reversed the conviction on possession charges, and remanded for a new suppression motion hearing and trial.
456 Mass. 578
Required Finding; Motion to Suppress; Affidavit; Presumptions and Burden of Proof; Confrontation of Witnesses; Search and Seizure; Certificate of Drug Analysis; Expert Opinion
The defendant was convicted of (1) distribution of cocaine, (2) possession of cocaine, and (3) distribution of cocaine within one hundred feet of a public park. The Appeals Court reversed the judgments of conviction, set aside the verdicts, and remanded the case after concluding that the motion judge erred in denying the defendant’s motion to suppress. The SJC concluded that the evidence was insufficient as a matter of law to warrant a guilty finding on the 2 distribution counts and directed that a judgment of acquittal be entered on those counts. The SJC reversed the judgment of conviction of possession of cocaine, on different grounds than that of the Appeals Court, and remanded the case for a new suppression hearing and trial.
A police officer sitting in an unmarked car observed a woman (Rivera) meet the defendant in a park. Rivera and the defendant walked to the courtyard of a residence and met with a man. The three walked into the building and were out of view of the officer. The defendant and River then left the building and returned to the park. The detective observed the defendant reach into his pocket, hold out his left hand with the palm up, put his right hand into his palm, and hand something to Rivera. The detective approached Rivera after she walked away from the defendant. When Rivera saw the detective, she threw an object to the ground, which the detective retrieved. The object was a one dollar bill containing a hard, off-white substance. After retrieving this object, he radioed to fellow officers of the drug control unit who were in the area, saying, “It’s a Saturday. Arrest that guy” (referring to the defendant). The detective explained to the jury that “[a] Saturday is a term used in the drug control unit when we recover drugs off the buyer.”
After the radio communication, two other officers approached the defendant while he was alone in the park. When they were nearly beside him, the defendant dropped an object that was in his hand. An officer picked up the hard, off-white substance.
Two certificates of drug analysis were admitted in evidence, one certifying that the substance in the one dollar bill contained cocaine, and the other certifying that the “loose substance” retrieved near the defendant contained cocaine.
Sufficiency of the Evidence
The trial judge denied the defendant’s motion for required findings of not guilty. The SJC concluded that a rational jury could have found that there was probable cause to believe the defendant distributed the cocaine that Rivera threw to the ground, but could not have found the defendant guilty of distribution beyond a reasonable doubt. Alternatives to the distribution theory, such as the possibility that the defendant and Rivera had both gone into the residence to purchase for their own use, and that the defendant had passed to Rivera something other than cocaine, were plausible enough to yield reasonable doubt. The defendant’s hand movements as he handed something to Rivera, as observed by the detective, were inconsistent with that of wrapping cocaine within a one dollar bill. The supposition that Rivera had wrapped the cocaine in a one dollar bill while the detective watched her was pure conjecture.
The SJC held that where there are two alleged sequential transactions in which the transfer of drugs was not witnessed, the Commonwealth must present evidence sufficient to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant during the second transaction distributed the drugs found in the possession of Rivera. Because the inferences from the evidence were too weak to permit a rational jury to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant distributed the cocaine in the dollar bill to Rivera, the SJC reversed the judgments of the distribution convictions.
Motion to Suppress
Defendant had filed a motion to suppress, claiming that he was stopped without reasonable suspicion and arrested without probable cause. The trial judge ruled that the drugs were not seized from the defendant because they were not found on him, and denied the suppression motion. The SJC held that the finding of fact (that the drugs were not found on the defendant’s person) was based on the oral representation of the prosecutor and not on the evidence at the hearing. The ruling of law was also erroneous; however, if the defendant dropped the drugs before he was stopped, then the drugs could not be the fruit of the seizure, and would not be subject to suppression regardless of the constituionaly of the subsequent stop. Because no evidence regarding the timing of the stop of the defendant in relation to the dropping of the drugs on the ground, the court could not assess whether the drugs on the ground were the fruit of the stop. There was also no evidence regarding the timing of the stop of the defendant in relation to the retrieval of the drugs dropped on the ground by Rivera; therefore, the court could not assess whether the defendant’s stop was supported by reasonable suspicion.
In a suppression motion alleging an unconstitutional search or seizure, (1) the detail in the motion and accompanying affidavit must be sufficient to enable a judge to determine whether to conduct an evidentiary hearing; and (2) the affidavit must be sufficiently detailed to give fair notice to the prosecution of the particular search or seizure that the defendant is challenging, so that the prosecution may determine which witnesses it should call and what evidence it should offer to meet its burden of proving probable cause, reasonable suspicion, or consent. Costa v. Commonwealth.
Here, the SJC found a lack of detail in the defendant’s motion and affidavit. The SJC concluded that appropriate action in this case was to vacate the judge’s denial of the motion to suppress, as well as her findings of fact and conclusion of law, and remand for a new motion hearing.
Certificate of drug analysis
The defendant argued that the admission of the drug certificates regarding the substance found next to him, without testimony by the analyst who conducted the testing, violated his 6th Amendment confrontation rights. In light of Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 127 S. Ct. 2527 (2009), the SJC held that it was error to admit the certificate. The issue is whether the admission of the certificate was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
Here, no independent evidence was presented to establish the composition of the substances and the Commonwealth relied solely on the certificate to prove that the substance was cocaine. The Commonwealth failed to establish that the error in admitting the certificate was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. The SJC reversed the judgment of conviction and remanded for a new trial.
It’s a Saturday
The SJC held that admission of the statement, “it’s a Saturday,” with the accompanying explanation that “Saturday” is the code word used by police officers when they recover drugs from the buyer, was evidence. Through this testimony, the detective offered his opinion that Rivera had bought cocaine from the defendant. Because his opinion would not be admissible if directly asked for it, it is not admissible through the use of a less direct statement.
In sum, the evidence was insufficient to support the distribution convictions and the SJC ordered that acquittal judgments be entered on those charges. The SJC reversed the conviction on possession charges, and remanded for a new suppression motion hearing and trial.
