Commonwealth vs. Nnaemeka Eneh, April 27, 2010
76 Mass. App. Ct. 672
Disclosure of Evidence, Certificate of Drug Analysis
The defendant was convicted of trafficking in cocaine and the lesser included offense of possession of heroin with intent to distribute by a Superior Court jury. The defendant appealed his convictions claiming that he was prejudiced by the prosecution’s delayed disclosure of bank records. The appeals court agreed and reversed the defendant’s convictions.
Facts
The defendant was arrested after attempting to sell substances that were later identified as heroin and cocaine to an undercover DEA special agent. The defense to these allegations was not a denial that any sale or sales had occurred, but rather that the defendant had been entrapped into making the sales by the special agent. The defense argued, beginning in their opening statements, that the defendant came to America as a student, but became addicted to heroin and was now begging on the streets for spare change to feed his addiction. The defendant also argued that the sales only occurred after constant pestering from the special agent, and at times when the defendant was so broke he needed the money and hoped to skim some of the drugs from the deal off in order to satisfy his addiction.
The next day, after opening statements concluded, the defendant informed the court that the prosecution had informed him of the existence of inculpatory bank statements the previous evening. The prosecution presented the court with bank statements from a joint account of the defendant and his girlfriend, which showed that they had nearly $14,000 in their savings account, but then stated that the prosecution would not use the statements in their case in chief. Over the objection of defense counsel, which argued, “I just described my client to the jury as a homeless drug addict panhandling for spare change, only to have a bomb dropped on me that he has more money in his bank account than I do,” and “That if this information had come out even a month ago my whole angle of attack would have been different”, the judge allowed the bank documents as evidence during the prosecution’s cross examination of the defendant’s girlfriend.
In analyzing whether the judge erred in failing to exclude the bank statements which the defendant claimed “eviscerated his defense”, the appeals court discussed whether there needed to be earlier disclosure of the statements and whether the defendant had been materially hurt by the evidence. The court stated that because the evidence had been available to the prosecution for some time, and especially since the defense counsel had informed the prosecution they would be proceeding with an entrapment defense, the prosecution should have re-examined the statements and told the defendant of their intentions to refer to them in the trial. The court further found that the defendant was materially hurt in his defense because the defense counsel had already made an opening statement claiming his client was poor and homeless, and had even promised that his clients would take the stand. The court reasoned that had he known about these statements he might not have argued as he did, and that because he had no choice but to call his clients or look like they were lying it was highly prejudicial to his case. The court agreed with the defendant and reversed all convictions.
The court then declined to address the defendant’s motion that the drug certification certificate should have been excluded because the convictions were already being dismissed. However, the court did say that at any retrial the certificates should not be introduced without the appropriate accompanying testimony required by Melendez-Diaz vs. Massachusetts, 129 S.Ct. 2527, 2532 (2009).
76 Mass. App. Ct. 672
Disclosure of Evidence, Certificate of Drug Analysis
The defendant was convicted of trafficking in cocaine and the lesser included offense of possession of heroin with intent to distribute by a Superior Court jury. The defendant appealed his convictions claiming that he was prejudiced by the prosecution’s delayed disclosure of bank records. The appeals court agreed and reversed the defendant’s convictions.
Facts
The defendant was arrested after attempting to sell substances that were later identified as heroin and cocaine to an undercover DEA special agent. The defense to these allegations was not a denial that any sale or sales had occurred, but rather that the defendant had been entrapped into making the sales by the special agent. The defense argued, beginning in their opening statements, that the defendant came to America as a student, but became addicted to heroin and was now begging on the streets for spare change to feed his addiction. The defendant also argued that the sales only occurred after constant pestering from the special agent, and at times when the defendant was so broke he needed the money and hoped to skim some of the drugs from the deal off in order to satisfy his addiction.
The next day, after opening statements concluded, the defendant informed the court that the prosecution had informed him of the existence of inculpatory bank statements the previous evening. The prosecution presented the court with bank statements from a joint account of the defendant and his girlfriend, which showed that they had nearly $14,000 in their savings account, but then stated that the prosecution would not use the statements in their case in chief. Over the objection of defense counsel, which argued, “I just described my client to the jury as a homeless drug addict panhandling for spare change, only to have a bomb dropped on me that he has more money in his bank account than I do,” and “That if this information had come out even a month ago my whole angle of attack would have been different”, the judge allowed the bank documents as evidence during the prosecution’s cross examination of the defendant’s girlfriend.
In analyzing whether the judge erred in failing to exclude the bank statements which the defendant claimed “eviscerated his defense”, the appeals court discussed whether there needed to be earlier disclosure of the statements and whether the defendant had been materially hurt by the evidence. The court stated that because the evidence had been available to the prosecution for some time, and especially since the defense counsel had informed the prosecution they would be proceeding with an entrapment defense, the prosecution should have re-examined the statements and told the defendant of their intentions to refer to them in the trial. The court further found that the defendant was materially hurt in his defense because the defense counsel had already made an opening statement claiming his client was poor and homeless, and had even promised that his clients would take the stand. The court reasoned that had he known about these statements he might not have argued as he did, and that because he had no choice but to call his clients or look like they were lying it was highly prejudicial to his case. The court agreed with the defendant and reversed all convictions.
The court then declined to address the defendant’s motion that the drug certification certificate should have been excluded because the convictions were already being dismissed. However, the court did say that at any retrial the certificates should not be introduced without the appropriate accompanying testimony required by Melendez-Diaz vs. Massachusetts, 129 S.Ct. 2527, 2532 (2009).
