463 Mass. 857 (2013)
A
Superior Court jury convicted the defendant of murder in the first degree. Following
a fight at the victim’s house that both the victim and the defendant
participated in, the defendant returned and shot the victim. The victim died
after a single bullet struck his heart. The defendant appealed his conviction,
and the Supreme Judicial Court affirmed his conviction.
The SJC reviewed the defendant’s
claim that the judge erred in the instruction of the jury on transferred intent
due to lack of evidence of such transfer. The SJC held that there was
sufficient evidence to support a transfer of intent instruction because the
defendant had either intended to kill someone who had participated in the
earlier fight, a group which included the victim, or intended to kill the
victim after he barred him from the house. In other words, there was no risk
that the defendant had intended to kill someone other than the actual victim or
a member of a group of persons that did not include the actual victim.
The defendant argued that it was
improper for a judge other than the trial judge to provide supplemental jury
instruction when the trial judge was neither sick nor disabled. The SJC held
that there was no violation of the law since the defendant did not object to
the substitution and because the trial judge participated in a phone conference
attended by the substitute judge and the defendant to answer a jury question. Additionally,
the judge had presided over the trial in person until the jury began their
deliberations and the only matter of substance addressed by the substitute
judge was the jury question.
The defendant also claimed that he
was denied effective assistance of counsel because his attorney claimed in his
opening statement that he would “prove” the defendant did not shoot the victim,
thereby assuming the burden of proof. The SJC held that while an attorney
should always be careful with claims of what they are able to prove, the
defendant’s counsel did not fail to provide effective assistance of counsel.
Even if the counsel’s performance fell below the standard of an ordinary
lawyer, it did not cause a substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice.
The SJC also reviewed the defendant’s
claim that in light of the evidence a conviction of voluntary manslaughter
would be more appropriate. The SJC held that the weight of the evidence did not
support a finding that the killing took place in the heat of passion arising
from reasonable provocation. The
defendant returned after leaving the victims home, which provided ample time to
cool off. The SJC upheld the defendant’s conviction.
Written 7/18/2013
