464 Mass. 855 (2013)
On
August 5, 1974, the defendant shot the victim who later died from the injury. The
defendant fled Boston. In September 1974, using an alias, he was arrested in
Chicago, Indiana, and charged with robbery. Boston police notified the Chicago
authorities that they wanted the defendant to answer for the charges in
Massachusetts. The defendant was tried and acquitted of the robbery charge and
was released without prior notice to the Boston police. Between 1975 and 1994,
the defendant was charged in Illinois and Indiana with four different aliases.
In 1994, Boston police learned that the defendant was in the custody of the
Indiana department of correction. Two Boston police detectives traveled to
Indiana and interviewed the defendant. In February 1996, Boston police informed
the Indiana department of correction that the defendant was still wanted for
murder in Massachusetts and provided the necessary warrants. In March 1997, the
defendant waived extradition and the Boston police brought the defendant back
to Massachusetts where he was indicted for murder in May of 1997.
Issue
and Holding:
1)
Whether the 23-year delay violated the defendant’s constitutional right to a
speedy trail.
No. The
court held that the defendant was not prejudiced by the delay in the murder
trial. The court reasoned that the delay was due to the defendant fleeing from
justice. Courts look at a four-factor test to determine whether a defendant’s
rights are violated by a lack of a speedy trial. The factors include: 1) the
length of the delay, 2) the reason for the delay, 3) the defendant’s assertion
of his right to a speedy trial, and 4) prejudice to the defendant. The court
concluded that the defendant’s constitutional right to a speedy trial was not
violated because the defendant evaded prosecution for the 23 year time period
of delay and because he did not assert his right to a speedy trial when he was
indicted in 1997, but waited till 2004 when his trial was about to begin.
2)
Whether the grand jury proceedings were impaired because the prosecutor
knowingly or recklessly presented false or misleading testimony and failed to
present exculpatory evidence
No. The
prosecutor did not knowingly or recklessly present false or misleading
testimony to the grand jury. In order for an indictment to be dismissed, due to
an impairment of the grand jury proceedings, three elements must be proven: 1)
the Commonwealth knowingly or recklessly presented false or deceptive evidence
to the grand jury, 2) the evidence was presented for the purpose of obtaining
an indictment, and 3) the evidence probably influenced the grand jury’s
decision to indict. The court reasoned that the testimonies heard in the grand
jury were not misleading as the defendant suggested. Also prosecutors are not
required to reveal all exculpatory evidence to a grand jury. Instead,
prosecutors are required to present exculpatory evidence that would “greatly
undermine the credibility of evidence likely to affect the grand jury’s
decision to indict.” The court also reasoned that even though the witnesses’ to
the crime did not speak to the police at the time of the shooting it was
unlikely to impair the witnesses’ grand jury testimony that they had seen the
defendant shoot the victim.
3)
Whether the loss of significant evidence violated the defendant’s right to a
fair trial.
No. The
defendant’s right to a fair trial was not violated by the loss of evidence. The
court reasoned that the missing evidence would have been unlikely to have
benefited the defendant and that the missing evidence was not apparently
exculpatory.
4)
Whether the admission of the victim’s death certificate, in violation of the
defendant’s right to confrontation, was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
Yes. The
error in admitting the death certificate into evidence, in violation of the
defendant’s right to confrontation, was harmless. The court reasoned that
although the admission of the death certificate in the absence of the medical
examiner’s testimony violated the defendant’s right to confrontation, the
actual death of the victim was not in dispute and therefore the admission of
the death certificate was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
Judgment:
Affirmed.
Written 7/8/2013
