Facts: On August 10, 1992, the Board of Registration in Medicine (board) issued a statement of allegations against the plaintiff, Hoffer, alleging that her ability to practice medicine has become impaired by “mental instability.” That same day, the board allowed a motion for summary suspension and issued an order temporarily suspending Hoffer's license to practice medicine. The order was upheld in a hearing before the chief administrative magistrate.
Hoffer and the board entered into negotiations. On March 6, 1996 the parties agreed to a stipulation where the suspension of Hoffer's license would be stayed as long as she sought psychiatric treatment and submit to monitoring by the board.
On March 14 2001, Hoffer entered into a probation agreement with the board which permitted her to return to the practice of medicine, subject to conditions similar to those listed in the 1996 agreement, including that her compliance be monitored by Physician Health Services (PHS).
In March 2004, Hoffer notified the board that she had ceased treatment with her psychiatrist, in violation of the probation agreement. In response to the violation, the board “vacated the stay” on the suspension of Hoffer's license.
Procedural History: Hoffer did not challenge this March, 2004 order until February, 2005 when she filed an action for damages in Superior Court. The court found for the board and Hoffer filed a second petition for review of the board's order in county court. The judge denied review as untimely, and Hoffer appealed to the “full court.” This appeal was stayed pending further proceedings before the board, but her appeal was subsequently dismissed as moot.
During the period in which Hoffer's appeal was stayed, she filed two petitions with the board requesting that she be allowed to resume the practice of medicine. The first petition was deferred pending Hoffer's completion of a psychiatric evaluation and receipt of documents from PHS. The second petition, which was filed in March, 2009, was denied by the board. Hoffer appealed this decision to the Supreme Judicial Court.
Issue: Whether Hoffer had a sufficiently certain expectancy in the reinstatement of her medical license that the denial of her petition constituted a deprivation of a constitutionally protected property interest?
No. The court premised its holding by stating that a plaintiff may rely on G.L. C. 30A, s14(1) (s14), which allows a plaintiff to seek judicial review of a final agency decision, only if that decision was a result of an agency adjudicatory proceeding. That being said, the court acknowledged that no statute would have required the board to grant Hoffer a hearing on her petition for reinstatement, nor did Hoffer have a constitutional right to a hearing because the expectancy or hope of a “future benefit is neither sufficiently certain nor sufficiently material to constitute a property interest under the Fourteenth Amendment.”
Here, the 2004 order allowed Hoffer to petition the board for a stay of suspension but the board ultimately retained the discretion to deny or accept the petition, the terms of which would be controlled by the board's discretion. Therefore, the court concluded that in light of the discretionary nature of the board's decision, Hoffer did not possess a sufficiently certain expectancy in the reinstatement of her medical license that the denial of her petition constituted a deprivation of a constitutionally protected property interest. Furthermore, since the board's order was not the result of an adjudicatory proceeding she was therefore, not entitled to judicial review under s14.
The court added, however that Hoffer was not without a judicial remedy. Under the certiorari statute provides an outlet for aggrieved parties to challenge decisions in quasi judicial administrative proceedings that are not otherwise reviewable. A plaintiff relying on a certiorari statute must sufficiently allege: “1) a judicial or quasi judicial proceeding, 2) from which there is no other reasonably adequate remedy, and 3) a substantially injury or injustice arise from the proceeding under review.” (quoting Indeck v. Client's Sec. Bd., 450 Mass. 379, 385 (2008)). In describing this avenue, the court classified the procedures adopted by the board as quasi judicial therefore allowing Hoffer to seek review of the board's decision by filing an action seeking a writ of certiorari.
Judgment: Remanded to the county court for further proceedings, consistent with this opinion. (MW)
