Commonwealth v. Katia Dotson

462 Mass. 96

Facts: Defendant Kate Dotson was convicted of disorderly conduct after an argument with her boyfriend on July 13^th 2008 near her Dorchester home.  On February 9^th, 2010 the defendant filed a motion to correct her sentence by arguing that the two year period of her probation sentence was no longer valid because the Legislature had amended Mass. R. Crim. P.30(a) to reduce a first time offense of disorderly conduct to a fine in 2009.  She argued that this amendment occurred before the time of her trial and conviction and therefore the two years of probation exceeded the maximum penalty she could receive as a first time offender.  The district judge denied her motion to correct the illegal sentence and she appealed.

Issue: Whether the 2009 amendment to G.L. c. 272, §53, that changed the punishment for a first offense, which became effective after the defendant engaged in disorderly conduct but before the time of her trial constituted a repeal of the prior version of that statute, thus, making the two years of probation that was issued an “illegal” sentence.

No – The defendant's punishment was incurred on July 13^th 2008, the date she committed the offense of disorderly conduct which was before the effective date of the repeal. Therefore, the defendant’s punishment would follow the G.L. c. 272 §53 version that was in effect on July 13^th, 2008.  The court reasoned that legislation is not applied retroactively unless there is an expressed intention to do so.  The 2009 amendment to G.L. c. 272, §53 did not demonstrate a retroactive intention and as a result the defendant who committed the offense before the amendment cannot receive the lessened penalty for a first time offense of disorderly conduct.

Judgment: Affirmed (CA).  

Heidi K. Erickson v. Commonwealth

462 Mass. 1006

Facts: The petitioner, Heidi K. Erickson, challenged the District Court's finding that she violated her probation, its imposition of a 30-day period of home detention and probation on modified terms, and sought a stay of the modified terms of probation. Both the petition and stay were denied by a single justice, after which the petitioner moved that the single justice be recused. The single justice denied recusal motion. The petitioner appealed this judgment.

Issues: Whether the single justice was obligated to consider petitioner's request for a stay or her claims concerning probation violation proceeding; and whether petitioner was entitled to the single justice's recusal.

No. The single justice was not obligated to consider petitioner's request for a stay or her claims concerning probation violation proceeding. This was not an extraordinary occasion where adequate alternative remedies do not exist due to the fact that the petitioner had already sought and been denied substantially similar relief from the District Court judge and a single justice of the Appeals Court.

No. The petitioner was not entitled to the single justice's recusal. The petitioner points to nothing more than the single justice's adverse rulings in this case and prior cases to support her claim that he was not impartial. There has been no showing in what is before us that the single justice was biased in this case, or that his ruling was “influenced by any considerations other than the law.” Nothing suggests the single justice abused his discretion or failed to apply the correct legal standards in denying relief. (CH)

Deidre Forknall v. Commonwealth

393 Mass. 502

Facts: The petitioner, Forknall, filed her petition in the county court after a judge in the District Court denied her motion to dismiss a complaint charging her with leaving the scene of property damage and operating a motor vehicle with a suspended license. The single justice denied the petition.

Issue: Whether this case presents the type of exceptional circumstances that warrant the exercise of this court's extraordinary power of general superintendence.

No. The petitioner’s argument was a claim that review of any adverse decision in the trial court cannot adequately be obtained on appeal because she “has various diagnosed mental disorders [that would leave her] completely emotionally drained [and unable to] be rational throughout ordinary appellate proceedings....”, but since she did not raise this claim before the single justice, the court did not need to consider it. (CH)

G.G., petitioner.

462 Mass. 1004

Facts: This is an appeal from a denial of relief by a single justice to order a judge in the Probate and Family Court to make a ruling on a complaint for contempt or, alternatively, assign a different judge to hear the contempt complaint. The father of twins shares joint legal custody with the mother, who has sole physical custody of the children, and filed a complaint for modification. The judge in that case, in the Probate and Family Court, issued a judgment ordering the parties to comply with a stipulated visitation schedule. After that the father filed a complaint for contempt, alleging that the mother refused to allow the children to visit with him. The mother, on the other hand, claimed that the children themselves resisted visitation with their father. After a hearing, the judge issued an order in which he found that contempt had not been proved by clear and convincing evidence, and he referred the matter to the Probate and Family Court's family service clinic for evaluation and recommendations. The judge did not enter a final judgment on the complaint for contempt, but did later state on the record that he would do so to permit the father to appeal. After unsuccessfully trying to have the judge recused, the father filed this petition.

Issue: Whether the father deserves extraordinary relief in this situation.

No. The father still had an alternate remedy available to him. Specifically, a motion in the trial court for entry of final judgment on his complaint for contempt. Due to the fact that the father has the right to appeal to the Appeals Court in the ordinary course, therefore he has not shown why this would not be an adequate remedy. The single justice neither erred nor abused his discretion by denying extraordinary relief. Judgment affirmed. (CH)

William H. Wolf v. Commonwealth

462 Mass. 1003

Facts: The petitioner, Wolf, was charged with various ordinance violations, but before the trial date for those violations he caused five subpoenas duces tecum to be issued. The Commonwealth moved to quash the subpoenas. A judge allowed this motion. The petitioner filed his petition, but it was denied by single justice.

Issue: Whether the petitioner has shown that “review of the trial court decision cannot adequately be obtained on appeal from any final adverse judgment in the trial court or by other available means.”

No. The petitioner did not make such a showing. He was incorrect when he argued that the “evidence excluded by totally quashing” the subpoenas cannot be evaluated on appeal because it will not be a part of the record and that the matter therefore “becomes unreviewable from a final trial judgment.” The court has held, in similar circumstances, that a defendant would be entitled to post-conviction relief if he is able to establish that he was improperly deprived of a summons directing production of the records; and that such relief is adequate. Wolf has offered no reason why he would not be entitled to seek the same type of relief in an appeal from any adverse judgment. (CH)

Sopheara Chen v. Commonwealth

462 Mass. 1002

Facts: The petitioner, Sopheara Chen, was convicted as a youthful offender on three indictments charging possession of a loaded firearm without a license after a jury-waived trial. The petitioner was also convicted, in a separate jury-waived trial on “subsequent offense” indictments, of three indictments charging unlawful possession of a firearm, second offense, and being a felon in possession of a firearm. 

The Appeals Court affirmed the convictions from the first trial, but reversed the subsequent offender 

convictions from the second trial, because the petitioner had not executed a separate written jury waiver prior to that jury-waived trial.

Prior to retrial, the petitioner moved to dismiss the subsequent offense indictments on the ground that double jeopardy principles barred retrial. The petitioner alleged that the evidence presented at the original trial on those charges was insufficient to support his convictions as a subsequent offender, and that the Appeals Court erred in concluding otherwise. A Juvenile Court judge denied the motion. The petitioner then filed a petition in the county court seeking relief from that order and dismissal of the subsequent offense indictments on double jeopardy grounds. A single justice of this court denied the petition.

Issue: Whether the petitioner’s circumstance is sufficiently extraordinary to fall into this court’s jurisdiction.

No. The Supreme Judicial Court is not a substitute for the ordinary appellate process nor is it “an additional layer of appellate review after the normal process has run its course.” Therefore, because the petitioner has received review of his double jeopardy claim (sufficiency of the evidence) prior to retrial, he has not sustained his burden. Judgment affirmed. (CH)