Facts: On
August 7, 1957, the defendant, who was twenty-five years old, raped a
seventy-two year old woman after breaking into the apartment where she was
staying. A jury convicted him of three counts of rape and he was sentenced to
nineteen and one-half to twenty years at the Massachusetts Correctional
Institution and an additional nineteen and one-half to twenty years, suspended
during ten years' probation. On February 26, 2008, the district attorney's
office, anticipating the defendant's release, filed a petition with the
Superior Court for the defendant's commitment as a sexually dangerous person
(SDP) under G.L. c. 123A.
Procedural History: At trial, two psychologists
testified and opined that the defendant was a SDP. The defendant also called a
psychologist and psychiatrist; one who testified that he was not a SDP and the
other who stated that there was not sufficient information to make a
determination either way. One expert testified that the defendant was unable to
conform his behavior to the requirements of institutions and that she did not
believe that probation would be effective. The judge also gave a curative
instruction, which ordered the jury not to speculate on any dismissed charges
mentioned during testimony, except to the extent those charges were relied upon
by the experts in the evaluation process.
The defendant was found to be a
SDP and he appealed arguing that the judge erroneously denied his motion for a
mistrial after one of the experts referred to the defendant's history of
offending against both female and male victims as a factor she considered in
arriving at her opinion.
Issue #1: Whether
the trial judge erred in denying the defendant's motion for a mistrial by using
an expert’s reference to the defendant's history of offending against “both
female and male victims” as a factor in arriving at her opinion that the
defendant was a SDP.
No. The
court found that any prejudice that might have been caused by the inadmissible
evidence was sufficiently remedied when the trial judge promptly struck the
witness's entire answer and issued a curative instruction during his final
charge, specifically addressing the issue of the defendant's prior sexual
offense charges.
Issue #2: Whether
the judge impermissibly provided to the jury an explanation of the G.L. c.
123A, § 9 release process (i.e. that the defendant would be able to petition
for release every twelve months)?
No. The
court found that brief explanations of the G.L. c. 123A, § 9 procedure were
necessary to explain the witness's answers; giving the jury the ability to make
an informed judgment about the witness's credibility. Furthermore, this
evidence was more probative than prejudicial to the defendant.
Issue #3: Whether
the judge erred in allowing the victim impact statement?
The
defendant argues that the judge erred in allowing the victim impact statement
because it was prepared for sentencing and not for trial. However, G.L. c.
123A, § 14(c) allows the introduction of “oral or written statements prepared
for and to be offered at the trial by the victims of the person who is the
subject of the petition.” The court found that in this case the statement was
short and added little to the otherwise considerable amount of evidence
admitted describing the governing offense. Furthermore, the judge gave a
curative instruction by explaining that the jury was to not base their verdict
on bias, prejudice, or sympathy to any party.
Issue #4: Whether
it was a prejudicial error to admit evidence of the defendant's refusal to meet
with the qualified examiners?
No. The
court found that this argument fails because it was not made to the trial judge
and may not be made for the first time on appeal.
Issue #5: Whether
the defendant’s commitment based on his diagnosis of antisocial personality
disorder violated his rights to due process under the Fourteenth Amendment to
the United States Constitution and Article 12 of the Massachusetts Declaration
of Rights?
No. The defendant’s
diagnosis was not the sole factor in the court’s determination that the
defendant was sexually dangerous. Rather, his diagnosis along with testimony
that his personality disorder made him likely to engage in sexual offenses if
not confined to secure facility formed the basis for such a determination.
Therefore, the court was satisfied with the jury’s verdict that the defendant
was a sexually dangerous person. (MW)
