Commonwealth v. Ruell
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court
March 14, 2011
459 Mass. 126
Homicide, Due Process of Law, Exculpatory Evidence, Juror Challenges for Cause
At trial, the jury convicted the defendant of murder in the first degree on theories of deliberate premeditation, extreme atrocity or cruelty, and felony-murder. The jury also found the defendant guilty of armed burglary and arson. On appeal, the defendant argued three theories for why the Supreme Judicial Court (SJC) should grant the defendant a new trial: first, the trial court improperly barred the defendant’s use of third party culprit evidence, second, it was an error for the judge to allow testimony of the medical examiner’s opinion as to the type of weapon used, and third, the trial court erred in denying four of the defendant’s challenges for cause during jury selection. The SJC affirmed the convictions, finding that there was no error or other reason to order a new trial or reduce defendant’s murder conviction to a lesser degree of guilt.
Facts
On October 10, 2005, the victim’s daughter discovered the victim, her mother, dead on the sofa of her home with a skull fracture. The home had been ransacked and the victim’s jewelry and cash were missing. A fire had been set on the bed, but had extinguished itself. The police noticed that the kitchen window of the home was open and an unsmoked Camel wide filter cigarette was stuck between the screen and the window. Deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) testing conducted later on the cigarette matched the defendant’s DNA profile. The police also noticed a footwear impression at the base of the kitchen window. On the previous evening, October 9, 2005, the victim’s next-door neighbor observed a man staring for about ten minutes at the rear of the victim’s home.
Three weeks before her death, because she did not have a checking account, the victim had $3,000 in cash in mostly $100 and $50 denominations. The victim kept the money in a handbag, which was not in the home after the daughter discovered the body.
On October 11, 2005, the defendant, a frequent drug user and a Camel wide filter cigarette smoker, purchased video game products with a $100 bill. The defendant appeared to have a wad of money that day. A few weeks later, the defendant gave his friend a bracelet. The defendant also showed the friend a green metal box that held jewelry the friend felt an older woman would wear. The defendant told the friend that he had won $3,000 from a scratch ticket, which is why he was carrying a wad of $20 bills. Later, the defendant purchased one pound of marijuana that was of better quality than the defendant had previously purchased. The defendant paid for the marijuana with $900 in $50 and $100 bills. The defendant also purchased $400 of cocaine.
While awaiting trial, the defendant admitted to another detainee that he had broken into a home and beat an old woman to death. After taking money, coins, jewelry, and a jewelry, the defendant said he gathered papers, poured perfume over them, and lit them before leaving. The defendant told another detained that he had burned holes in the screen to get through the window and he was scared when the woman approached him, so he hit her in the head with a hammer several times.
Third Party Culprit Evidence
The defendant argued that the Massachusetts’ standard for the admissibility of third party culprit evidence violates the standard established under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the US Constitution by the US Supreme Court in Holmes v South Carolina, 547 U.S. 319. The SJC found no difference between the standard in Holmes and the Massachusetts standard that excludes third party culprit evidence if it is prejudicial or confusing to a jury or if the evidence is too remote or speculative. Both standards also require that there be substantial links between the evidence and the crime.
The defendant further argued that the Massachusetts standard was unfair because courts only admit third party culprit evidence when the evidence has substantial probative value while courts admit the government’s evidence if the probative value outweighs the danger of unfair prejudice. The SJC concluded that there was no unfairness, as the Court had advised that courts should err on the side of admissibility if there are doubts about the third party culprit evidence.
The SJC concluded that there were no errors in excluding the third party culprit evidence because the evidence did not show that any of the third parties committed the crime.
Testimony of Medical Examiner’s Opinion about Murder Weapon
At trial, the medical examiner testified that the victim’s attacker used a small axe or hatchet to fracture the victim’s skull. Over the defendant’s objection, the medical examiner showed the jury a drywall hammer that the medical examiner believed was consistent with the injuries the victim sustained. The defendant argued on appeal that the judge abused his discretion by admitting this evidence because the police had not found the murder weapon. The SJC held that evidence that that these type of tools could have been used was relevant to the prosecution’s evidence about the defendant’s access to tools. Neither was there an error in allowing the jury to see the drywall hammer because prosecution made it clear to the jury that the hammer had been purchased a few weeks prior to the trial.
Challenges for Cause in Jury Selection
The SJC also rejected the defendant’s argument that the judge erred in denying four of his challenges for cause during jury selection, which subsequently forced the defendant to exhaust all of his preemptory challenges. The judge is given discretion in deciding whether a potential juror could be impartial and, here, the four jurors stated that they could be fair during deliberations and their various backgrounds would not affect their ability to be fair.
Substantial Miscarriage of Justice
Per G.L. c. 278 § 33E, the SJC has the duty to review the entire record to determine if there has been a substantial miscarriage of justice or another reason to order a new trial or reduce the conviction to one of a lesser degree.. The SJC concluded that there were no errors or other reason to order a new trial; the reduction of the defendant’s murder convictions to a lesser degree of guilt was also not warranted.
Convictions affirmed.
- Prepared by JM
