Commonwealth v. Dennis Hadley
Massachusetts Court of Appeals
December 8, 2010
Docket No. 09-P-1177
Motion to Suppress, Voluntariness of statement, Miranda waiver, Involuntary manslaughter, battery
A jury in the Superior Court found the defendant guilty of involuntary manslaughter by battery. Defendant appeals the verdict on the grounds that there was insufficient evidence to support his conviction and the judge wrongly refused to suppress two separate sets of statements: oral and written statements made shortly after the battery and oral statements made two years after the incident.
Facts
The defendant and the victim, Daniel McMullen, occupied the same cell at Worchester County jail and house of correction. On February 3, 2005 at approximately 2:30 A.M., other inmates overheard banging and yelling coming out of the defendant and McMullen's cell. One inmate heard the defendant say "Don't make me put my boots on" (which in prison slang means that one is ready to fight) and "I don't want to hurt you." Another inmate heard the defendant say "Don't do it," I'm trying to save your life," and "just stay down." Correction officers came to the cell at the calling of the defendant and found McMullen sitting on a stool with a bleeding lip and an abraded chin and the defendant "quite calm."
At 3:20 A.M. Sergeant Thomas Chabot recited Miranda warnings to the defendant, who affirmed he understood the warnings and signed a Miranda waiver form. The sergeant asked whether the defendant kicked the victim, which the defendant denied after pausing momentarily before answering. The defendant explained that he pushed the victim due to a disagreement and due to this push, he fell against the bunk and onto the floor. This oral description of the events was then transferred to a brief written statement. Sergeant Chabot later testified at trial that the defendant acted normal during this interview.
Later this same day, the victim developed abdominal pain and returned to the hospital. Doctors diagnosed him with a lacerated spleen and internal bleeding and although doctors were able to stop the bleeding, he died twenty days after the incident due to a serious infection and multiple organ failure. The medical examiner attributed the victim's death to splenic laceration complications due to blunt impact and described the victim's pre-existing conditions of liver disease and an enlarged spleen as contributory factors. The medical examiner also testified that the injury to the enlarged spleen was consistent with the infliction of trauma, such as that from a kick.
Two years later the defendant spoke to correction Officer Adams regarding his pending trial and volunteered that he had been upset with the victim and had kicked him in the mouth and then in the torso as he attempted to get up. At the trial, the judge allowed voir dire questioning of Officer Adams and Sergeant Michael Sampson and found the following facts: Officer Adams did not initiate the conversation with the defendant; the defendant asked Adams if he knew anything about the trial; Adams stated he knew only generally about the case, to which the defendant made the statements at issue. Furthermore, knowledge of this conversation was made known to the prosecutor only because Adams casually mentioned the conversation with Sergeant Sampson, his residential neighbor, who then told state police after reading an article about the trial.
Issue 1: Was there sufficient evidence to find for a conviction of involuntary manslaughter by battery?
The defendant contends that there is insufficient evidence that he committed a battery that he "knew or reasonably should have known to either endanger human life or create a high degree of likelihood of substantial harm to the victim" (the first element required for the charge of involuntary manslaughter by battery) because he did not know of the victim's pre-existing condition. The court, however, points out that the lack of this awareness does not eliminate the defendant's culpable mentality. A rational jury could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant reasonably should have realized that successive boot kicks to the head and midsection endangers human life or creates a high degree of substantial harm because the head and midsection house various vital organs to life and the defendant. kicked the victim in the mouth and then in the torso when he was attempting to get up. Even without knowledge of the victim's pre-existing conditions, he should have "appreciated that risk."
Issue 2: Were the defendant's Miranda Rights violated when he gave statements to Sergeant Chabot?
Defendant argues that his statements to Sergeant Chabot violated his Miranda rights because he did not knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily give the statements to him because he suffered from bio-polor disorder, a severe mental illness.
Looking at all the evidence, especially the defendant's different interactions with different correctional officers showing consistently calm and rational behavior, and testimony from a medical professional familiar with the defendant's medical record, the court found ample evidence that supports the motion judge's denial of the suppression motion. In addition, the defendant's refraining from mentioning to correction personal of his kick to the victim further establishes his presence of mind in the subsequent interview with Sergeant Chabot. Therefore, the court found no reason to overturn the motion judge's denial of the suppression motion.
Issue 3: Did the trial judge improperly deny the defendant's motion to suppress as to statements made to Officer Adams?
The defendant lastly contends that the trial judge improperly denied his motion to suppress his statements made to Officer Adams because the officer's failure to advise him not to speak in the absence of his attorney violated his Sixth Amendment right to counsel.
The trial judge concluded that the statements made by the defendant to Officer Adams were not the result of an interrogation or questions but were only spontaneous conversation uttered by the defendant to the officer. The facts show that the officer did not elicit any statements, did not engage in focused questioning, or otherwise exploit an opportunity to question the defendant without his counsel present. Therefore, the trial judge's denial of the suppression motive is upheld.
Judgments Affirmed.
Prepared by AAO
