Commonwealth v. Truong, October 7, 2010
78 Mass. App. Ct. 28
Juvenile Record, Impeachment, Statutory Interpretation, Due Process
The defendant was charged with and later convicted of possession of ammunition without a firearm identification card under G.L.c. 269, § 10(h). On appeal, the defendant challenged the impeachment of his credibility with his juvenile record. The defendant also questioned whether spent shell casings were prohibited under the statute under which he was convicted. Lastly, the defendant challenged the statute under which he was convicted as being vague and in violation of his due process rights under the United States and Massachusetts Constitutions. The Appeals Court affirmed the conviction.
Facts
The police observed bullet holes and shell casings on the street. When the police sought to execute the warrant, the defendant’s girlfriend met the officer. The police asked for the defendant and the defendant’s girlfriend escorted the officers to a third floor bedroom. The defendant identified himself as the person for whom the police were looking and stated that he lived in that location.
The police searched the house pursuant to the search warrant. The police found three spent shell casings near the bed, a soda can containing several spent shell casings outside the bedroom door, a gun holster and a spent shell casing in the bureau, and an assortment of ammunition stuffed into the rafters in the basement. The police also found the a piece of paper with the defendant’s name taped to the door the bedroom, the defendant’s name written on the mirror in the bedroom, and the defendant’s learner’s permit in the bureau.
At trial, the defendant’s defense was that he did not know from where the items came and that he did not live at that address. The defendant’s girlfriend testified that her younger sister had found the shell casings on the playground and the girlfriend had placed them in the soda can. The defendant’s girlfriend also testified that she had taken the gun holster away from her sister.
Juvenile Record
During direct examination, the defendant implied that he did not know at the time the police executed the search warrant what a spent shell casing was. The Commonwealth then used the defendant’s juvenile record of a conviction for possession of ammunition to impeach the defendant’s credibility. The defendant challenged the use of the conviction, claiming there was not a certified record of the conviction as required by G.L.c. 233, § 21. The Appeals Court found that this was a legitimate use of the conviction because the Commonwealth was not seeking to impeach the defendant by proof he had been convicted of a crime, but to rebut the defendant’s claim that he did not know what a shell casing was. G.L.c. 233 only applies when trying to prove the conviction of a crime.
Statutory Interpretation
The defendant also argued that the statute, G.L.c. 269, § 10(h), did not prohibit the possession of spent shell casings. The statute prohibits the possession of ammunition without complying with applicable statutes. Ammunition is defined in the statute as “cartridges or cartridge cases, primers (igniter), bullets or propellant powder designed for use in any firearm, rifle or shotgun.” G. L. c. 269, § 10(o).
The Appeals Court noted that the statute should be interpreted “according to the plain and ordinary meaning of its words.” Commonwealth v. Truong, 78 Mass. App. Ct. 28, 31 (2010), quoting Commonwealth v. Murphy, 68 Mass. App. Ct. 152, 154 (2007). In reviewing the dictionary definitions and the usage in case law of “cartridge cases” and “shell casing”, the Court found that the words could be used interchangeably. Therefore, the shell casings found in the defendant’s room were cartridge cases within the meaning of the statute.
Vagueness of the Statute
The defendant also argued that the statute is void because it was vague about the meaning of cartridge cases. For the same reasons listed above, the Appeals Court found that there was no vagueness, so the statute was not void. Because the defendant argued this for the first time on appeal, the Court applied the substantial risk standard of review and found that there was no error and no “substantial risk of a miscarriage of justice.”
Due Process
Lastly, the defendant argued for the first time on appeal that the statute did not satisfy the rational basis test, so the statute deprived the defendant of due process under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Applying the substantial risk standard of review here, the Court found that the legislative purpose of protecting the public from the use of ammunition was reasonably related to the statute. Therefore, the statute did not violate the Due Process Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment or the Massachusetts Constitution. Because there were no violations, there was not a “substantial risk of a miscarriage of justice.”
The convictions were affirmed.
- Prepared by JM
