DISCLAIMER:

These summaries of case decisions are intended for informational purposes only. They are not intended to be interpretations of the law, nor do they encompass the subtleties of each case. Therefore, reference to the original text is indispensable.



Friday, October 8, 2010

Com. v. LeBoeuf, 10/8/10

Commonwealth v. LeBoeuf, October 8, 2010
78 Mass. App. Ct. 45

Fourth Amendment, Warrantless Seizures, Random Stops, Administrative Inspections

The defendant was charged with operating a motor vehicle on a suspended license under G.L.c. 90, § 23.  The defendant claims that the random stops conducted by the Framingham Police Department’s “Truck Team” that were not based on reasonable suspicion of a violation were in violation of the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution.  The case was reported to the Court of Appeals by a judge of the District Court to answer the challenges to the stop presented by the defendant prior to the trial.  The Court of Appeals is permitted to review this case pursuant to Mass.R.Crim.P. 34 when the US Supreme Court or any of the appellate courts in MA have not considered the question.


Facts
On March 10, 2009, a Framingham police officer was in the parking lot of a vacant restaurant performing administrative safety inspections of commercial vehicles when he noticed a large dump truck driven by the defendant.  The officer believed that the dump truck might be over 10,000 pounds, which would make it a commercial vehicle subject to a random stop.  After having the defendant pull into the parking lot, the officer approached the defendant and requested his license, medical certificate and registration of the truck.  The defendant told the officer he could not provide a valid commercial driver’s license because it had been revoked.

The officer who stopped the defendant was a member of the Framingham Police Department’s “Truck Team,” whose goal it was to enforce federal and state commercial vehicle regulations.  The officer had been certified as an inspector by the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration (FMCSA) (a division of the United States Department of Transportation).  The officer’s duties included identifying and randomly selecting commercial motor vehicles for administrative safety inspections, as he did the night the officer pulled over the defendant.

Fourth Amendment Challenge
Though this specific question of the constitutionality of the random stops of commercial has yet to have been considered, the Court finds that the analysis in Commonwealth v. Tart, 408 Mass. 249, is applicable to the case at bar.  In Tart, the SJC found that warrantless administrative inspections of commercial fishing vessels were constitutional.  There, the SJC found that there were three factors to consider: 1) whether the Commonwealth has a substantial interest in regulating the industry, 2) whether the mobile nature of the industry makes random, warrantless checks essential, and 3) whether the statute provides an adequate substitute for a warrant.

Of the three factors to consider, the defendant only argued that the statute did not provide for a satisfactory substitute for a warrant because the statute and regulations do not place limits on the time, place, or frequency of the random stops.  The Court rejected this argument, noting that a warrant serves two functions: 1) to advise the owner that the search is being made according to the law and 2) to limit the discretion of the officers executing the warrant.  Here, the statutes provide for both functions.  The statute only allowed licensed FMCSA agents to perform the inspections, restricted the inspections to commercial vehicles in operation, and limited what may be inspected to the license, registration, drug and alcohol testing records, and hazardous waste records.  The statute also forewarns drivers that they may be required to produce a license.  Therefore, the statutes and regulations provide an adequate substitute for a warrant.

The defendant also argued that an administrative safety inspection, even if found to be constitutionally sound may not be initiate “by a random, suspicionless traffic stop.”  The relevant federal statute, 49 C.F.R. § 396.9(a), specifically authorizes a random, suspicionless traffic stop.

Lastly, the defendant contends that the random administrative safety inspections should be likened to a random selection of vehicles at a sobriety checkpoint, which has been prohibited.  The Court also rejected this argument, finding that the commercial vehicle industry is heavily regulated by the government, so there are not the same privacy concerns that exist with individuals at sobriety checkpoints.

The Appeal Court concluded that the random stops of commercial vehicles for administrative safety inspections were reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.  The Appeals Court then remanded the case to the District Court for further proceedings.



- Prepared by JM