DISCLAIMER:

These summaries of case decisions are intended for informational purposes only. They are not intended to be interpretations of the law, nor do they encompass the subtleties of each case. Therefore, reference to the original text is indispensable.



Tuesday, July 6, 2010

Com v. Rivas, 7/6/10

Commonwealth v. Felix Rivas, July 6, 2010
77 Mass. App. Ct. 210

Drug Certificate, Search and Seizure, Reasonable Suspicion, Motion to Suppress

The defendant was convicted of trafficking in cocaine with a net weight of twenty-eight grams or more in violation of G.L. c. 94C, §32E(b)(2). The defendant appealed, arguing that the admission of laboratory drug certificates violated his rights under the 6th Amendment to the US Constitution. He also appealed from an order denying a motion to suppress, in which the motion judge concluded that a red rejection inspection sticker affixed to the defendant's vehicle supplied the police with an objectively reasonable suspicion to stop the defendant. The Appeals Court reversed the conviction and remanded for a new trial due to the error in the admission of drug certificates. The Appeals Court affirmed the denial of the motion to suppress.


Facts

Detective Fraser was a member of the New England fugitive and high density drug unit. His routine involved stopping vehicles for any observed violations, which in about 10-15% of cases resulted in the confiscation of drugs or guns.

On January 31, 2005, Detective Fraser observed the defendant driving a car with a red rejection inspection sticker on the windshield. Believing that a red rejection sticker affixed to the windshield prohibited operation of the vehicle, he activated his lights. The defendant pulled over and was unable to provide a valid license or registration. As Detective Fraser reached inside the center console to locate the vehicle's registration, he observed a black pouch on the driver's side floor. The pouch contained a substance lab tests later identified as cocaine, as well as a digital scale and a plastic spoon.


Certificates of drug analysis

Melendez-Diaz v. Massachuetts, 129 S.Ct. 2527 (2009) establishes that the admission of the drug certificates, over the defendant's objection, violated the confrontation clause and was error. The Appeals Court applied the “harmless error” standard of review. Here, no field tests were performed, none of the witnesses was involved in generating the drug certificates, none of the officers observed the effects of the substances on anyone ingesting them, and the trial judge did not make a finding that any of the officers were qualified to testify as to the nature of the substances.

The Appeals Court reversed the defendant's conviction and remanded the case for a new trial, because the Court could not conclude that the admission of the drug certificate was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.


Motion to suppress

A certificate of rejection does not automatically prohibit a car from being driven; a certificate of rejection does indicate that the car may have failed a safety test and has not passed another since the failed test. 540 Code Mass. Regs. § 4.07(3)(b). The motion judge found that at the time of the stop, Detective Fraser mistakenly believed that a car could never be driven with a red certificate of rejection. The defendant argued that Detective Fraser's stop of the vehicle was premised on a mistake of law and therefore unreasonable, in violation of the 4th Amendment to the US Constitution and art. 14 of the MA Declaration of Rights.

The Appeals Court determined that there was no mistake of law here. The red rejection sticker, until corrected, provides an objective factual basis for concluding that there is or may be a defect that makes operation unlawful. Because a reasonable police officer could have suspected that the defendant was driving his car illegally, Detective Fraser's subjective understanding was immaterial to the analysis. Based on the presence of the red rejection sticker, the police officer reasonably believed that the car was being driven in violation of safety standards as set forth in G.L. c. 90, § 20, a civil infraction. Detective Fraser therefore had reasonable suspicion to stop the car and the motion judge properly denied the defendant‟s motion to suppress.

Judgment reversed, verdict set aside, case remanded for a new trial. Denial of the motion to suppress affirmed.


- Prepared by AYK