Commonwealth v. Gualberto Barrero Cruz, May 13, 2010
456 Mass. 741
The defendant was convicted of murder in the first degree on the theory of felony-murder, armed home invasion, and unlawful possession.
On appeal, the defendant argued that (1) the judge abused her discretion in denying his motion for a continuance made on the first day of trial; (2) the judge abused her discretion when she admitted in evidence the defendant’s prior bad conduct; (3) the defense counsel’s opening statement misstated which party had the burden of proof and confused the jury; and (4) the judge denied the defendant his right to counsel when she denied his motion for a mistrial based on the difficulties and deterioration of his relationship with counsel during the trial.
Continuances
Defendant’s counsel at trial had filed a motion to continue the trial date, advising the court of a ‘relationship ending’ argument between counsel and defendant; that a specific defense had yet to be investigated; that trial counsel had yet to establish the trust between counsel and defendant necessary for productivity; and that the preparation time allowed the defense counsel was insufficient.
The trial court held a hearing and the motion was denied. The court found sufficient time to prepare the case and denied the motion to continue absent specifics as to what had not or could not have been done since new counsel entered the case.
The reasons underlying a request for a continuance are to be given significance in the judge’s decision to grant or deny the request. The SJC held the defendant in this case failed to provide a persuasive reason for a continuance and instead relied on general assertions that the defense could ‘benefit’ from more time.
Admission of prior bad acts
At trial, defendant had moved to exclude evidence of prior bad acts on the grounds of relevance and prejudice. The trial judge admitted in evidence those acts that were not too far removed in time from the crime to be more relevant than prejudicial. Each time a witness testified to one of the admissible prior acts, the judge carefully instructed the jury regarding the limited purpose for which they could consider the testimony
Prosecution may introduce evidence of the defendant’s prior misconduct if it is relevant for some purpose other than showing that he has a bad character or the propensity to commit the crime charged. Here, evidence of the defendant’s prior misconduct was relevant to show motive, state of mind, and intent. Scrupulous analysis of all evidence proposed by the Commonwealth and a heightened sensitivity to minimizing the prejudicial impact of the evidence appropriately balanced the evidence’s probative value against any undue prejudice.
Opening Statement
The defendant claimed the defense counsel’s opening statement caused confusion with respect to the burden of proof and required relief under G. L. c. 278, § 33E. Instructions to the jury that mislead them regarding the government’s burden of proof constitute constitutional error. The defendant relied on Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 281-282 (1993) for the proposition that the confusion created by defense counsel’s comments require reversal or a lesser degree of guilt.
456 Mass. 741
The defendant was convicted of murder in the first degree on the theory of felony-murder, armed home invasion, and unlawful possession.
On appeal, the defendant argued that (1) the judge abused her discretion in denying his motion for a continuance made on the first day of trial; (2) the judge abused her discretion when she admitted in evidence the defendant’s prior bad conduct; (3) the defense counsel’s opening statement misstated which party had the burden of proof and confused the jury; and (4) the judge denied the defendant his right to counsel when she denied his motion for a mistrial based on the difficulties and deterioration of his relationship with counsel during the trial.
Continuances
Defendant’s counsel at trial had filed a motion to continue the trial date, advising the court of a ‘relationship ending’ argument between counsel and defendant; that a specific defense had yet to be investigated; that trial counsel had yet to establish the trust between counsel and defendant necessary for productivity; and that the preparation time allowed the defense counsel was insufficient.
The trial court held a hearing and the motion was denied. The court found sufficient time to prepare the case and denied the motion to continue absent specifics as to what had not or could not have been done since new counsel entered the case.
The reasons underlying a request for a continuance are to be given significance in the judge’s decision to grant or deny the request. The SJC held the defendant in this case failed to provide a persuasive reason for a continuance and instead relied on general assertions that the defense could ‘benefit’ from more time.
Admission of prior bad acts
At trial, defendant had moved to exclude evidence of prior bad acts on the grounds of relevance and prejudice. The trial judge admitted in evidence those acts that were not too far removed in time from the crime to be more relevant than prejudicial. Each time a witness testified to one of the admissible prior acts, the judge carefully instructed the jury regarding the limited purpose for which they could consider the testimony
Prosecution may introduce evidence of the defendant’s prior misconduct if it is relevant for some purpose other than showing that he has a bad character or the propensity to commit the crime charged. Here, evidence of the defendant’s prior misconduct was relevant to show motive, state of mind, and intent. Scrupulous analysis of all evidence proposed by the Commonwealth and a heightened sensitivity to minimizing the prejudicial impact of the evidence appropriately balanced the evidence’s probative value against any undue prejudice.
Opening Statement
The defendant claimed the defense counsel’s opening statement caused confusion with respect to the burden of proof and required relief under G. L. c. 278, § 33E. Instructions to the jury that mislead them regarding the government’s burden of proof constitute constitutional error. The defendant relied on Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 281-282 (1993) for the proposition that the confusion created by defense counsel’s comments require reversal or a lesser degree of guilt.
The SJC held that any confusion was offset by the judge’s frequent instructions to the jury that the burden of proof was on the Commonwealth to prove the defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
Denial of right to counsel; denial of motion for mistrial
The first motion for a mistrial was premised on the basis of insufficient time to prepare for trial. The SJC determined that the defendant’s recalcitrance and lack of cooperation had been a tactic of delay during the entire course of the trial, and thus there was no legitimate basis on which to grant a mistrial. The SJC determined no abuse of discretion.
The second motion for a mistrial was premised on the basis of the breakdown of the attorney-client relationship. The trial judge had attempted to facilitate the defendant’s cooperation with his attorney by addressing the defendant directly to reiterate the importance of the legal process and his participation in it. The breakdown of the attorney-client relationship is a basis for a new trial only when it leads to an ‘apparently unjust verdict,’ deprives the defendant of an adequate defense, or threatens his right to a fair trial. Commonwealth v. Tuitt, 393 Mass. 801, 806 (1985). The SJC determined that the tensions between the defendant and his counsel did not affect the conduct of the trial as a whole, and it was not error for the trial judge to deny the motion for mistrial.
The SJC affirmed all judgments, concluding that the evidence supported the defendant’s conviction of murder in the first degree by felony-murder, the defendant was represented by effective counsel, there was no unfairness in the proceedings, and there was no basis on which to reduce the verdict.
